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ABSTRACT 
 
In (two-party) privacy-preserving-based applications, two users use encrypted 
inputs to compute a function without giving out plaintext of their input values. Privacy-
preserving computing algorithms have to utilize a large amount of computing resources 
to handle the encryption-decryption operations. In this dissertation, we study optimal 
utilization of computing resources on the graphic processor unit (GPU) architecture for 
privacy-preserving protocols based on secure function evaluation (SFE) and the Elliptic 
Curve Cryptographic (ECC) and related algorithms. A number of privacy-preserving 
protocols are implemented, including private set intersection (PSI), secret handshaking 
(SH), secure Edit distance (ED) and Smith-Waterman (SW) problems. PSI is chosen to 
represent ECC point multiplication related computations, SH for bilinear pairing, and the 
last two for SFE-based dynamic programming (DP) problems. They represent different 
types of computations, so that in-depth understanding of the benefits and limitations of 
the GPU architecture for privacy preserving protocols is gained. 
For SFE-based ED and SW problems, a wavefront parallel computing model on 
the CPU-GPU architecture under the semi-honest security model is proposed. Low level 
parallelization techniques for GPU-based gate (de-)garbler, synchronized parallel 
memory access, pipelining, and general GPU resource mapping policies are developed.  
This dissertation shows that the GPU architecture can be fully utilized to speed up SFE-
based ED and SW algorithms, which are constructed with billions of garbled gates, on a 
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contemporary GPU card GTX-680, with very little waste of processing cycles or 
memory space.   
For PSI and SH protocols and underlying ECC algorithms, the analysis in this 
research shows that the conventional Montgomery-based number system is more 
friendly to the GPU architecture than the Residue Number System (RNS) is. Analysis on 
experiment results further shows that the lazy reduction in higher extension fields can 
have performance benefits only when the GPU architecture has enough fast memory. 
The resulting Elliptic curve Arithmetic GPU Library (EAGL) can run 3350.9 R-ate 
(bilinear) pairing/sec, and 47000 point multiplication/sec at the 128-bit security level, on 
one GTX-680 card. The primary performance bottleneck is found to be lacking of 
advanced memory management functions in the contemporary GPU architecture for 
bilinear pairing operations. Substantial performance gain can be expected when the on-
chip memory size and/or more advanced memory prefetching mechanisms are supported 
in future generations of GPUs. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In their seminal work [96] published in 1982, Yao et al. formulated the 
Billionaire problem, in which two principals want to compare their wealth without 
giving each other their actual amounts, and proposed a very general way to do so, called 
Secure Function Evaluation (SFE). In SFE, the two principals, who are commonly called 
the generator and the evaluator, use encrypted inputs to jointly compute an arbitrary 
function on two interconnected computers. The final computing result is revealed to one 
or both principal(s), but plain-text of the inputs are unrevealed to each other. A rich body 
of literature has been developed from the original Billionaire problem to the field of 
privacy-preserving computing. Major privacy-preserving protocols include, but are not 
limited to SFE, Private Set Intersection (PSI) [45][26][31][53][55] where two principals 
jointly compute the common element(s) for their two input sets without giving out to 
each other the plain-text of all distinct elements, Secret handshake (SH) [26][50] where 
two principals mutually authenticate each other based on privacy-preserving equality 
checking of a one-time registered group secret [26], Private Information Retrieval (PIR) 
[20] where the index of a database query is unrevealed to the owner of the database in a 
query transaction, and Homomorphic encryption (HE) [33] where two principals use 
encrypted inputs to jointly compute an arithmetic function. 
Some examples of privacy-preserving applications aim to answer questions, such 
as “which input is bigger: (    
   )”, “Edit distance of two strings: ED(s1, s2)”, 
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“intersection of two sets of strings: COMMON(S1, S2)”, etc. While most applications can 
be implemented by SFE, non-SFE based solutions have also been developed. For 
example, several studies [26][31][53][55] implemented PSI based on Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [56], although PSI could also be formulated as an SFE function  
COMMON(S1, S2) [45]. Another important example of non-SFE based privacy-
preserving protocols is SH, ECC [26][50], RSA [84] or Diffie-Hellman (DH) [25] crypto 
systems can be used to implement SH. 
In this dissertation, we focus on the design and the performance evaluation of 
SFE and ECC-based PSI and SH on an integrated CPU-GPU system architecture. For 
SFE, the main performance challenge is to run a vast number (billions or more) of 
garbled gates [96], which are composed of oblivious-transfer (OT) [82] and block-
cipher operations (for example, SHA [73] and AES [74]), with few waste of 
computational strength provided by the CPU-GPU system architecture. The main 
performance challenges for ECC to achieve the highest throughput on GPU include (1) 
the low level data access model for arithmetic operands, (2) matching of the number 
system with respect to architecture, (3) the parallel computing model for arithmetic 
operations, and (4) the efficiency of arithmetic optimization techniques. Overall, for 
optimal performance outcomes, the system needs to have tight synchronization of 
processing steps, memory accesses, and GPU-CPU memory swapping, so that idle 
cycles and swapping overheads are minimized, while the degree of parallelism is 
maximized. For ECC, the four factors are closely related to each other. As such, our 
design process is coupled with a system performance characteristics process, so that 
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lessons learnt from the study can help identify system bottlenecks for future 
improvement of architectures and algorithms.  
1.1 Summary of Research Tasks 
An overview of the overall design space explored in this dissertation is illustrated 
in Figure 1.1, in which green blocks represent major technical elements of our work. To 
investigate SFE related design problems on the CPU-GPU architecture, we adopt the 
specification languages SHDL (Secure Hardware Description Language) proposed in 
Fairplay [65] to describe the SFE functions studied in this dissertation. For the study 
cases, we select privacy-preserving computation of the dynamic programming (DP) for 
Edit Distance (ED) and Smith-Waterman (SW) [5]. ED (SW) has been used for privacy-
preserving assessment of dissimilarity (similarity) of two genomic sequences [52]. By 
using SHDL, the SFE-based ED problem and the SFE-based SW problem are 
represented by two networks of interconnected garbled (Boolean) gates, respectively. In 
this dissertation, these two problems are solved based on a divide-and-conquer strategy 
to partition the interconnected garbled gates, and encryption/decryption operations are 
executed on the GPU in batches. The resulting parallel code follows a wavefront 
computing pattern, which needs highly synchronized memory accesses. Parallelization 
of the two studied cases represent much higher challenges than parallelization of SFE-
based AES [43], Hamming distance [43][52], RSA [30], or Dot product [46], whose 
intermediate results are immediately re-used and then discarded. According to [52], the 
memory requirement for the SFE-based ED (SW) problem can be tens of Giga Bytes 
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when the input length of the ED (SW) problem exceeds 10
3
 (10
2
). As such, to study 
spatial efficient memory management mechanisms for SFE and the associated low-cost 
synchronization strategies for reading and writing intermediate results on the CPU-GPU 
architecture, we set 5000×5000 as the problem size of the ED problem, and 60×60 as the 
problem size of the SW problem. 
In terms of the security model for SFE, we adopt the semi-honest security model 
[44][52], where principals follow the SFE protocol but may infer the input data from 
cipher-text of intermediate results produced during protocol steps. Following [52], we 
adopt the ultra-short security level proposed in TASTY [40], which is equivalent to the 
80-bit security level. 
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Figure 1.1 The Design Space of SFE, PSI and SH Implementations. 
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For our study of ECC-based PSI and SH, ECC point multiplication [56] is chosen 
for PSI, and bilinear pairing [87] in ECC for SH, because the vast majority of privacy-
preserving protocols is based on ECC. A Barreto-Naehrig (BN) curve [10] is chosen for 
both PSI and SH as the underlying elliptic curve due to its computational efficiency [32]. 
BN-curve-based R-ate pairing [60] is adopted as the bilinear pairing algorithm due to its 
less (or similar) computational complexity than other variants [34][42][66]([99]) of 
bilinear pairing on BN curves. To achieve the 128-bit security level, -(2
62
+2
55
+1) is used 
as the construction parameter of the BN curve, and the twelfth extension field [87] as the 
highest extension field [10]. 
In the CPU-GPU system architecture, the GPU works as a co-processor for the 
CPU to perform designated computations. For SFE and ECC-based PSI and SH, 
computing tasks designated to run on the GPU need to be optimized with respect to the 
single instruction multi-thread (SIMT) architecture and the memory hierarchy of GPU, 
as well as the CPU-GPU control mechanisms, for best performance. These cross-layer 
resource management issues are highlighted at right side of Figure 1.1.  
The major research tasks in this dissertation are listed below, and a graphic 
illustration of these tasks is given in Figure 1.2. Research tasks for SFE and ECC-related 
PSI and SH follow different paths to reflect their very different computing structures. 
SFE Related Research Tasks  
- (R1.1) Investigation of the partition policies for a network with billions of 
garbled gates, and the associated GPU-based resource mapping policies in 
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order to maximize the system throughput; the pipelining mechanism of the 
encryption/decryption operations is also studied; 
- (R1.2) Investigation of memory management mechanisms on CPU and GPU, 
and associated synchronization strategies for storing and re-using 
inputs/outputs of encryption/decryption operations, and intermediate de-
garbled results on GPU. 
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ECC Related Research Tasks 
- (R2.1) Studying and implementing PSI and SH protocols in a case study [77] 
to understand the usage of parallelized point multiplication and bilinear 
pairing in real-world privacy-preserving applications; 
-  (R2.2) Exploring an efficient parallel computing model of low-level 
arithmetic operations on GPU, including the evaluation of number systems 
and data storage formats; 
- (R2.3) Evaluating the suitability of optimization techniques for point 
multiplication and bilinear on the contemporary GPU architecture; 
- (R2.4) Identifying major performance bottlenecks for computing point 
multiplication and bilinear pairing on the contemporary GPU architecture; 
-  (R2.5) Developing a GPU-based library for point multiplication and bilinear 
pairing, which can fit future GPU architecture without major code changes; 
Some critical conclusions derived from this research are highlighted below. For 
SFE, the results of research tasks (R1.1) and (R1.2) show that the GK104 Kepler chip 
(marketed by NVIDIA in 2012) can be fully utilized to speed up the SFE-based ED 
algorithm and the SFE-based SW algorithm, with very little waste of processing cycles 
or memory space. For ECC, low level resource management techniques are designed and 
tested to eliminate major resource wastes. It is discovered in (R2.2) that, the 
conventional Montgomery number system [68] is more GPU-friendly than the Residue 
Number System (RNS) based number system [2] on the GK104 chip. Through (R2.3), it 
is found that the acceleration effect of the lazy reduction [3] technique has the best 
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performance when it is applied to the quadratic extension field on the GK104 chip. It is 
found through (R2.4) that, since a large number of data swapping between fast on-chip 
cache and slow off-chip device memory are triggered by the complex computations steps 
of bilinear pairing, the primary performance bottleneck for bilinear pairing on the 
GK104 chip is lack of advanced device memory management functions. However, the 
GK104 chip is quite effective for speed up of point multiplication and arithmetic in the 
quadratic extension field. Last, but not least, is that through (R2.5), a library, called 
Elliptic curve Arithmetic GPU Library (EAGL), is produced to empower future 
generation of research in this area.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide an 
overview of SFE protocol, point multiplication and bilinear pairing algorithms, and 
modern GPU architecture. Chapter 3 summarizes previous studies. Chapter 4 presents 
the parallel computing model for the ED problem and the SW problem, respectively. In 
Chapter 5, we first study the usage of point multiplication and bilinear pairing in PSI and 
SH protocols. Then, we discuss the parallel computing model for point multiplication 
and bilinear pairing. We conclude with some final marks in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE 
 
In this chapter, we first present the background knowledge of SFE, PSI and SH, 
and then the ECC algorithms used to construct ECC-based PSI and SH protocols. In the 
end, the contemporary GPU architecture, the Kepler GPU, is introduced. 
2.1 Secure Function Evaluation 
The Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) proposed to use the term garbled circuits 
(GC) to implement privacy-preserving applications, such as secret auctions [17][72], 
biometric or genomic computation [43][44][52], facial recognition [28][40][76][85] and 
encryption [40][43][58]. In SFE, the garbled circuits (GC), and its the fundamental build 
block garbled gates, and the roles of the two principals (the generator and the evaluator) 
are defined as follows:  
An n-bit-in, 1-bit-out garbled gate G implements an n variable “secure” (or, 
“privacy-preserving”) Boolean function. Same as a regular gate, a garbled gate has a 
truth table specified based on the Boolean function. Each input or output bit for both 
types of gates can be represented as a “wire”, but in a garbled gate each wire is 
associated with a pair of random integers, called a pair of wire labels, rather than a 
single 1-bit value 0/1 as in a regular gate. 
Taking the 2-bit input, 1-bit output garbled gate, denoted by c=G(a,b), as an 
example, its wire labels are denoted by {ka
0
,ka
1
},{kb
0
,kb
1
}, {kc
0
,kc
1
}, where each entry, 
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say ka
0
, is a unique random number assigned to the value 0 at the “a” input of c=G(a,b). 
In the secure computing process of G, the value of its 1-bit input “wire” a (b) is provided 
by the generator (the evaluator), and the generator and the evaluator jointly compute the 
wire labels of c. 
To compute c=G(a,b) jointly, a should receive the generator’s 1-bit value x, and 
b the evaluator’s 1-bit value y. Here x and y can be either 0 or 1, and we denoted y’ as 
the negation of y. The generator first generates {ka
0
,ka
1
},{kb
0
,kb
1
}, {kc
0
,kc
1
} for possible 
values {0, 1} of wires a, b, and c. The encrypted wire labels for the evaluator’s inputs, 
{kb
y
, kb
y’
}, are transferred from the generator to the evaluator via Oblivious Transfer 
(OT) [82]. In the end of OT, the evaluator only knows kb
y 
and the generator only knows 
that one of {kb
y
, kb
y’
} has been chosen by the evaluator. The generator also sends the 
wire label ka
x
 to the evaluator. 
If a garbled gate G(a,b) accepts one direct 1-bit input from the evaluator, one OT 
transaction is needed in SFE. Therefore, computing a single SFE instance may need 
multiple OT transactions. Based on a random oracle model proposed in [48], a virtually 
unlimited number of OT computations can be encoded into 80 1-out-of-2 OT 
transactions, where 80 is a security parameter. Huang et al. [43] reported that such 80 1-
out-of-2 OT transactions can be computed in 0.6s. Therefore, the primary computing 
bottleneck is caused by the block-cipher operations for the vast number of garbled gates, 
not by the OT. As such, the discussion of OT is not included in this dissertation. 
The computing logic of c=G(a,b) is a four-entry truth table T{T00, T01, T10, T11}, 
where each entry, say T00, is a value 0/1 and is mapped the output wire label kc
0
 / kc
1
. 
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The garbled truth table is a random permutation of the four cipher-texts: 
{Eka
0
(Ekb
0
(kc
T00
)), Eka
0
(Ekb
1
(kc
T01
)), Eka
1
(Ekb
0
(kc
T10
)), Eka
1
(Ekb
1
(kc
T11
))}, here E denotes 
the encryptor (also known as garbler), and the encryption/decryption operation is also 
known as garbling/de-garbling. In the end, with ka
x
 and kb
y
, the evaluator learns the wire 
label kc
Txy
 that represents the real value of G given inputs a=x and b=y, while it does not 
know x.  
program And { // SFDL
        const N=2;
        type Len = Int<N>;
        type AliceInput = Len;
        type BobInput = Len;
        type AliceOutput = Len;
        type Input = struct {AliceInput alice,  BobInput bob};
        type Output = struct {AliceOutput alice};
        function Output output(Input input) {
           output.alice = (input.bob & input.alice);
        }
}
SHDL (compiled from SFDL): 
0 input         //output$input.bob$0
1 input         //output$input.bob$1
2 input         //output$input.alice$0
3 input         //output$input.alice$1
4 output gate arity 2 table [ 0 0 0 1 ] inputs [ 2 0 ] //
output$output.alice$0
5 output gate arity 2 table [ 0 0 0 1 ] inputs [ 3 1 ] //
output$output.alice$1
 
Figure 2.1 An Example of SFDL and SHDL 
In Fairplay [65], a GC and the ownership of its I/O data can be specified in the 
Secure Function Description Language (SFDL) and the Secure Hardware Description 
Language (SHDL). A simple example of SFDL and SHDL is illustrated in Figure 2.1, 
which describes the logic “(a AND b)”, where a and b are 2-bit inputs belonging to the 
generator (Alice) and the evaluator (Bob), respectively. Gate 4 and gate 5 in the SHDL 
code are examples of G; and “[0 0 0 1]” in the description of Gate 4 is an instance of 
truth table T{T00, T01, T10, T11}. The “output” descriptors in the front of Gate 4 and Gate 
5 specify that the output wires of these two gates are the output of this GC. Computing 
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(a AND b) is equivalent to separately computing Gate 4 and Gate 5 and exporting their 
de-garbled results as the de-garbled results of this GC. 
2.2 Private Set Intersection and Secret Handshake 
Private Set Intersection (PSI) and Secret Handshake (SH) are two widely used 
privacy-preserving computing protocols, where PSI is used by two principals to compare 
the common element(s) in their two input sets without giving out the plain-text of all 
distinct elements to each other, and SH is used by two principals to mutually 
authenticate each other based on a one-time registered group secret. In an ECC-based 
implementation of PSI, point multiplication operations are executed O(k) times per PSI 
instance, where a malicious adversary has 1/k possibility to guess the correct result using 
a brute force method. Besides ECC and SFE, PSI can also be implemented based 
oblivious pseudo-random function evaluation [39][51]. 
SH was first proposed in Balfanz et al. [9]. In SH, if the two principals know a 
common group secret, their SH session will succeed and they know they are in the same 
group. Otherwise, the group secret of each principal is unrevealed to the other. The two 
critical properties of SH are un-linkable and re-usable. “Un-linkable” indicates that 
when one player A gives two (different) copies of his encrypted group secret to two 
other players B and C in two separated authentication sessions, B and C do not know 
they are authenticating with the same person A when they compare the encrypted data 
received from A. “Re-usable” means A can re-use its group secret in multiple SH 
sessions. Ateniese et al. [6] and Jarecki et al. [50] implemented un-linkable SH schemes 
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with re-usable group secrets involving a third-party CA. Duan et al. [26] proposed a 
bilinear-pairing-based SH that satisfied both un-linkable and re-usable properties without 
using CA. In their protocol, to complete a single SH instance, each principal needs to run 
one bilinear pairing operation. 
2.3 Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Algorithms 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed by Koblitz et al. [56] and 
Miller et al. [67]. They independently suggested the use of elliptic curve groups in 
public key cryptography. Comparing with RSA [84] or Diffie-Hellman (DH) [25] of the 
same secure strength, ECC needs a much shorter key size. For example, 256-bit key size 
in ECC has the same secure strength as 3072-bit key size in RSA [38] (equivalent to 
128-bit AES secure strength). 
Let K be a finite field and E(K) an additive group of points on an elliptic curve E 
over K, E(K) is defined as the set of points (x, y),  x, y  K, a point (x, y) satisfies the 
Weierstrass equation: 
y
2
 + a1xy + a3y = x
3
 + a2x
2
 + a4x + a6 (2-1) 
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6  K. E(K) also includes an extra point O, called point at infinity. 
The number of points on E(K) is called the order of E(K) and is denoted by #E. In this 
dissertation, q is chosen as a large prime number, K = Fq is a finite prime field, and the 
Weierstrass equation (2-1) is selected as: 
y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b , where a, b  Fq (2-2) 
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Point Multiplication is the multiplication between a multi-precision integer k and 
a point P on E(Fq), in a format of [k] P. The result of [k] P is also on E(Fq). Computing 
[k] P is an accumulation process of point addition of k number of point P. Let P(x1, y1), 
Q(x2, y2) be two points on E(Fq), the point addition R’(x3, y3) = P(x1, y1) + Q(x2, y2) is 
computed as follows: 
x3 = 
2
 – x1 – x2, y3 =  (x1 – x3) – y1   (2-3) 
 = (y2 – y1)/(x2 – x1) if P  Q, OR  = 3(x1
2
 + a)/2y1 if P = Q  (2-4) 
P
Q
R
R’ = P+Q
x
y
curve E
P
R
R’ = [2]P
x
y
curve E
 
    Figure 2.2 (a) Point Addition,     (b) Point Doubling on E(Fq) 
The effect of (2-3) and (2-4) in the affine co-ordinate system is illustrated in     
Figure 2.2: the straight line joining P and Q intersects E(Fq) at another point R, the point 
R’ = P+Q is obtained by negating the y-axis co-ordinate of R. A special case of point 
addition R’ = P + P occurs when P = Q, which is also illustrated in (2-4) and     Figure 
2.2. When P = Q , by taking the tangent to E(Fq) at P, there is one tangent line that must 
intersect E(Fq) at a point R, then the point R’ = P + P = [2] P is obtained by negating 
the y-axis co-ordinate. A point subtraction R’ = P – Q is equivalent to a point addition 
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after negating subtrahend Q’s Y-coordinate y2, and the point subtraction has the 
property: P = (P+Q) – Q. 
The basic bilinear pairing algorithm e(P, Q) is a bilinear mapping: G1 × G2 → 
GT, where G1=G2=GT=E(Fq
k
), k is an integer and Fq
k
 an extension field of Fq. Its bilinear 
property, which is represented as e([a]P, [b]Q) = e(P,Q)
ab
 = e([a]P, Q)
b
 = e(P, [b]Q)
a
, 
where a and b  Fq, is usually used to construct privacy-preserving protocols. One of the 
most popular ordinary [32] curve families used to implement bilinear pairing is the BN 
curve family, which has the form of y
2
 = x
3
 + b defined over Fq. Given the construction 
parameter u, a BN curve is constructed as follows: the trace of Frobenius over Fq is t(u)= 
6u
2
+1, the modulus q(u) = 36u
4
+36u
3
+24u
2
+6u+1, the order n(u) = 
36u
4
+36u
3
+18u
2
+6u+1. When u reaches 64-bit and the embedding degree k=12, the 
security strength of the bilinear pairing computation is equivalent to 128-bit AES [10]. 
Input: P in E(Fq)[r], Q in E(Fqk)[r] ∩ Ker(πq-[q]),
 and a=6u+2=∑i=0ai2i, a has L effective bits
Output: Ra(Q, P)
1:  T←Q, f←1;
2:  for i = L-2 to 0, step is 1, do:
3: T←2T;
4: f←f2 ∙ lT,T(P)
5: if ai==1:
6:     T←T+Q;
7:     f←f ∙ lT,Q(P)
8: end if
9:  end for
10: return f← (f ∙ (f ∙ laQ,Q(P))q  ∙ lπ(aQ+Q),aQ(P))(q^k-1)/r
 
            Figure 2.3 Miller's Algorithm for R-ate Pairing 
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The implementation of bilinear pairing is called Miller’s algorithm [87]. It has 
several optimized variants, based on different families of elliptic curves. The variant 
adopted in this dissertation is R-ate pairing. Miller’s algorithm for R-ate pairing is 
displayed in Figure 2.3. In Figure 2.3, Fq is a finite field with modulus q, k the 
embedding degree, E/K an elliptic curve E over a field K, E[r] the group of all r-torsion 
points of E, and E(K)[r] the K-rational group of r-torsion points of E over field K. Let πq 
be the q-power Frobenius endomorphism on E(Fq), G1 = E(Fq)[r], G2 = 
E(Fq)[r]∩Ker(πq-[q]), t the trace of πq, PG1 and QG2, the function of R-ate pairing 
[60] over BN curves [10] is Ra(Q, P) = (f ∙ (f ∙ laQ,Q(P))
q
 ∙ lπ(aQ+Q),aQ(P))
(q^k-1)/r
, where a = 
6u+2, u is the BN curve construction parameter, f = fa,Q(P) the rational function and lA,B 
the line function [87] through point A and B. The algorithm is commonly divided into 
two major steps: lines 2-9, called Miller Loop (ML), and line 10, known as Final 
Exponential (FE). In FE, The exponentiation by (q
k
-1)/r promises a unique result. 
2.4 Modern GPU Architecture 
The experimental devices used in our work are based on the Compute Unified 
Device Architecture (CUDA) [36]. GTX-680 is a GK104 generation device [30][36], 
which contains 8 streaming multiprocessors (SMX). Each SMX can concurrently run 
multiple GPU threads. These threads are grouped into 32 parallel threads, called warps. 
Each SMX has 192 CUDA cores along with 32 load/store units, which allow for a total 
32 threads per clock to be processed. However, for better utilization of the pipeline, it 
usually simultaneously runs multiple warps of threads in one SMX. Warps of threads 
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assigned to the same SMX and dispatched to run at the same time are called a block of 
GPU threads. Each SMX also contains four warp schedulers with eight dispatch units 
that process 64 concurrent threads (2 warps) to the cores. For the fast data storage, each 
SMX has 64K 32-bit registers and 64KB on-chip shared memory/L1 cache. The shared 
memory resides on 32 64-bit banks. The on-chip fast shared memory is usually used as 
cache or shared variables among threads in the same block. Two SMXs share one global 
memory controller, and each memory controller ties with a 128KB L2 cache. In total, 
there are four memory controllers and 512 KB L2 cache. Via these memory controllers, 
SMXs could access the 2GB slow global memory. The global memory clock is 
1502MHz, and the global memory bandwidth is 256-bit.  
A program on GPU is called a kernel function. Its input setup, parallelism 
configuration, launching and output read-back are controlled by a host thread on CPU. 
Once a kernel function is launched, its host thread could release the CPU time-slice and 
be waken until the kernel function completes. At runtime, following the Single 
Instruction Multi Threads (SIMT) architecture, each GPU thread runs one instance of the 
kernel function. The degree of parallelism is determined by (1) the register usage per 
thread, (2) the shared memory usage per thread. To fully utilize the computational 
strength of the Kepler GPU, the degree of parallelism needs to be raised as much as 
possible to cover the memory accessing latency and other overheads in the pipeline of 
CUDA cores. Any shared memory access bank conflicts, code path divergence and 
explicit synchronization command will stall the concurrent execution of a warp and thus 
should be avoided. Succinctly put, key design objectives include maximizing the degree 
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of parallelism, minimizing buffer usage, four-cycle-cost synchronization across threads 
in the same block, branch divergence, and shared memory bank conflicts. 
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CHAPTER III  
RELATED WORK 
 
In this chapter, we first discuss previous work on optimization techniques for 
SFE, point multiplication and bilinear pairing. Then, we report existing CPU-based 
benchmarks of the SFE-based ED problem and the SFE-based SW problem, and CPU-
based or GPU-based benchmarks of point multiplication, and bilinear pairing. 
3.1 Secure Function Evaluation 
Besides the Fairplay [65] introduced in the previous chapter, TASTY [40] was 
another work that studied the composibility of privacy-preserving applications. TASTY 
provided a programming language to construct privacy-preserving applications via SFE-
based GCs and HE-based arithmetic functions. To optimize the computation of SFE, 
several techniques had been proposed: free-XOR [57] which replaced block-cipher 
operations by XOR operations for the XOR gate, “permute-and-encrypt” [65] which 
reduced the de-garbling process of a garbled gate to one block-cipher operation, the m-
to-n garbled lookup table and the compact-circuit design [43] which reduced the number 
of garbled gates for a number of SFE-based problems, and the garbled-row-reduction 
(GRR) [79] which reduced 25% space of the garbled result for each gate. 
Jha et al. [52] proposed three protocols for the SFE-based ED problem and the 
SFE-based SW problem. Their protocol-3 solved a 200×200, 8-bit alphabet ED (60×60 
SW) problem in 658 (1000) seconds. Later, by using all the optimization techniques 
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mentioned in the previous paragraph, Huang et al. [43] computed a 2000×10000 8-bit 
alphabet SFE-based ED problem in 223 minutes, and a 60×60 SFE-based SW problem 
in 415 seconds, both on two computes with Intel Duo E8400 3GHz CPUs. For CPU-
based benchmarks of SFE-based problem in the malicious model, we refer readers to 
[46][58]. 
Frederiksen et al. [30] parallelized the OT transactions and multiple instances of 
one garbled circuit on GPU, in the malicious security model. But our work was different 
from theirs. Their privacy-preserving applications were limited to one GC, which was 
insufficient to describe the SFE-based ED problem or the SFE-based SW problem. Their 
parallelization strategy is launching thousands of independent GPU threads while each 
GPU thread runs an independent SFE instance. Comparing with their work, our work 
focuses on parallelization of a large scale SFE instance on GPU. And our parallelization 
strategy partitions independent blocks of GCs of the single SFE instance and run these 
independent blocks simultaneously. Due to the difference on parallelization strategies, 
our implementation requires more complicated synchronization mechanisms that theirs. 
CUDASW++ [62] was one of the most famous open source projects that ran the plain-
text SW problem on GPU. In CUDASW++, the storage of DNA query scores was re-
organized to minimize overheads for memory access. Because real values of scores are 
replaced by paired wire labels in SFE, we do not follow their storage scheme. Instead, 
we develop our collision-free storage model for wire labels and eliminate the memory 
interface competition. And to minimize memory heap operations, we develop a static 
memory management scheme to maintain wire labels and intermediate results of the 
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garbling/de-garbling process. A slice-by-slice GPU resource mapping policy was 
proposed in CUDASW++. As we observe that the privacy-preserving requirement of 
SFE introduces new inter-dependency for computation steps on the generator side, we 
develop a new GPU resource mapping policy for the generator. And for the 
computations on the evaluator side, since the privacy-preserving requirement of SFE 
only complicates the computation steps, we develop a more fine-grained GPU resource 
mapping policy than that in CUDASW++. 
3.2 Point Multiplication and Bilinear Pairing 
Elliptic curves over finite fields can be divided into two types: the supersingular 
(SS) curves, and the ordinary (non-supersingular) curves. Let the trace of E/Fq be t = 
q+1-#E(Fq). If the greatest common divisor of t and q equals 1, then E is ordinary, 
otherwise E is SS. For their simplicity and ease of modular multiplication, SS curves 
have been proposed to construct pairing-based cryptographic protocols. But SS curves 
have limitation on the potential values of the embedding degree k, and it requires to use 
curves of characteristic 3 when its embedding degree k = 6 [1][24]. As proved in [54], 
implementing characteristic 3-based arithmetic operations on GPU brings either more 
space cost, or more complicated logic and thus harder for parallelization. Therefore, we 
prefer to use ordinary curves and compute the pairing algorithm under characteristic 2. 
One ordinary curve can be claimed as a pairing-friendly curve when two 
conditions are satisfied: a prime r ≥   dividing #E(Fq), and k with respect to r is less 
than log2(r) / 8 [32]. One of the most popular pairing-friendly ordinary curve families is 
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the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) [10] curves, in which the curve parameters are represented by 
polynomials of the construction parameter u. Recently, Pereira et al. [78] proposed an 
implementation-friendly subclass of BN curves that brought better computational 
efficiency. 
A major approach to accelerate Miller’s algorithm is by reducing the length of 
Miller Loop. Barreto et al. [11] extended the Duursma-Lee method [27] to supersingular 
abelian varieties using the ηT pairing. The Ate pairing on hyper-elliptic curves [34], the 
twisted Ate pairing [42][66] and its variation Ate pairing [99] on ordinary curve reduced 
the loop length to log2(|t − 1|) / 8, where t was the trace. An optimal Ate pairing [94] 
was able to attain the iterations of Miller Loop to its lower bound. The R-ate pairing [60] 
obtained even shorter loop length than [34] on certain pairing-friendly elliptic curves. 
Other efforts [4][16][86][87][88] worked on arithmetic optimization, such as 
denominator elimination, final exponentiation simplification, and faster variants of 
Miller’s algorithm under the Jacobian [16] or the Edwards co-ordinate [13], efficient 
formulas for various curves with twists of degree 2,3,4 or 6 [23]. 
Antão et al. [2], Bernstein et al. [12] and Szerwinski et al. [93] pioneered the 
implementation of point multiplication on CUDA. Szerwinski et al. [93] straight forward 
ported multi-precision arithmetic on GPU. Bernstein et al. [12] represented a 224-bit 
multi-precision operand into 24 32-bit float point numbers and achieved 5895 point 
multiplication per second on one GTX-285 GPU. Antão et al. [2] implemented point 
multiplication under Residue Number System (RNS) and achieved 9827 point 
multiplication per second on one GTX-295 at the 112-bit security level. However, Antão 
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et al. [2] did not have a comparison of computational complexity between conventional 
Montgomery and RNS-based Montgomery number system on GPU, and directly adopted 
RNS-based Montgomery number system. Longa et al. [63] and MIRACL [69] reported 
two of the best CPU-based benchmarks of point multiplication. The former was on a 
standard elliptic curve and the latter on a twisted curve over Fq
2
 [63]. MIRACL [69] 
could run 14509 point multiplication per second on 3.0GHz AMD Ph. II X4 CPU at the 
112-bit security level, and Longa et al. [63] 22472 point multiplication per second on 
2.6GHz AMD Opteron at the 128-bit security level. Another recent work [19] also 
adopted RNS-based Montgomery as the number system to implement bilinear pairing on 
FGPA. 
Two recent studies worked on GPU-based bilinear pairing solutions: Zhang et al. 
[98] implemented Tate pairing over a base field with a composite order, and Katoh et al. 
[54] ηT pairing in characteristic 3. Both papers serially implemented the reduction 
function [68] due to its difficulty for parallelization. As we will discuss later, a parallel 
version and a serial version of the reduction function are developed in our work, and we 
compare their performance to evaluate which solution is more efficient on the 
contemporary GPU architecture. Moreover, both papers ignored the parallelization of the 
final exponentiation (FE) step, which was almost as the same cost as Miller Loop (ML) 
(check Table 2 in [14] for the computing cost comparison between ML and FE). We aim 
to support parallelized ML, FE. Additionally, we also aim to support exponentiation over 
Fq
12
 for privacy-preserving protocols that may further run exponential steps on the result 
of bilinear pairing. 
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CHAPTER IV  
LARGE SCALE PRIVACY-PRESERVING ED/SW PROBLEMS ON GPU 
 
In this chapter, we present the parallel computing model to compute the large-
scale privacy-preserving Edit-Distance and Smith-Waterman problems on the 
contemporary GPU architecture, with state-of-the-art optimization techniques such as 
free-XOR [57], oblivious transfer extension [48], permute-and-encrypt [65], efficient 
lookup-table design and compact circuits [44]. We will first discuss the inter-
dependency among computation steps of the SFE-based Edit-Distance (ED) problem 
and the SFE-based Smith-Waterman (SW) problems, on both the generator and the 
evaluator sides. Then, we present the low-level GPU gate garbler/de-garbler. Next, we 
discuss details of the pipelined computation steps for the SFE-based ED problem and the 
SFE-based SW problem, respectively. In the end, to verify the efficiency of the system 
proposed in this dissertation, we evaluate the execution result of a 5000×5000 8-bit 
character SFE-based ED instance and a 60×60 SFE-based SW instance. 
Recalling the garbling/de-garbling process of a garble gate c=G(a,b) introduced 
in the subchapter 2.1, the generator generates wire labels {ka
0
, ka
1
}, {kb
0
, kb
1
}, {kc
0
, kc
1
} 
for a, b, and c, runs four block-cipher operations as the garbling process of G, sends the 
digests of block-cipher operations to the evaluator, and then the evaluator runs the same 
number of block-cipher operations as the de-garbling process of G to decrypt a wire 
label of c. In this process, it is the evaluator who really computes the result of gate G. 
Supposing another gate e=G’=(c,d) exists and it re-uses G’s output c, for the generator, it 
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can simultaneously garbling G and G’ if it has generated all wire labels {ka
0
, ka
1
}, {kb
0
, 
kb
1
}, {kc
0
, kc
1
}, {kd
0
, kd
1
} and {ke
0
, ke
1
}. However, for the evaluator, it needs the de-
garbling result of G to de-garbling G’, and thus de-garbling G’ must follow the de-
garbling process of G. 
... ...
...
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.
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Figure 4.1 Parallel Computing Models for the (a) ED, (b) SW problems 
Before we discuss inter-dependency of the SFE-based ED problem and the SFE-
based SW problem on the generator side and the evaluator side, we first present our 
divide-and-conquer design strategy for the parallel computing model. Our design 
strategy has two levels: the GC level at the bottom, and the DP level on the top. At the 
GC level, the vast number of gates are concurrently garbled on the generator side, or de-
garbled on the evaluator side. At this level, we focus on maximizing the degree of 
parallelism for the garbling/de-garbling process with minimum idle cycles on the GPU. 
Satisfying the ultra-short security level [40] is also considered at this level. At the DP 
level, we focus on fully utilizing the degree of parallelism provided by the GC level, 
while the inter-dependency described in the previous paragraph is satisfied.  
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To understand the inter-dependency of the SFE-based ED problem and the SFE-
based SW problem, we first analyze the inter-dependency in their plain-text counter 
parts. As we will show later, computing one entry of the DP matrix in the plain-text ED 
(SW) problem is dependent to the results of three neighbor entries on its top, left and 
top-left (the neighbor entries on the same column and the same row, and the neighbor 
entry on its top-left). The inter-dependency in the plain-text ED and SW problem are 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, respectively. Parallelization of the ED problem and the SW 
problem fits the “wavefront” pattern [62], which is proposed for tree computation where 
child nodes depend to their parents. The term wavefront describes the edge separating 
the executed nodes from nodes waiting for execution in the next round. In Figure 4.1, the 
N×N DP matrix is processed into 2N-1 slices, W= {S1, S2, …, S2N-1} and a slice Si is a 
diagonal from the top right to the bottom left. And for entries of the DP matrix, called 
slots, they are independent to each other if they are on the same slice. When applying the 
wavefront pattern to the SFE-based ED and SW problems, we treat entries of the DP 
matrix, called GC-slots, as the atomic module at the DP level. Then, for the evaluator, 
GC-slots are independent when they are on the same slice. The degree of parallelism 
equals to the length of a slice, which increases from S1, S2 until SN, and then decreases 
from SN to S2N-1. For de-garbling GC-slots on Si, the pre-requisite is the de-garbled 
outputs on slices Si-2 and Si-1. And hence, the de-garbling process can only de-garble one 
slice at a time, which means Si is mapped to GPU units after Si-1 is completed. 
However, for the generator, according to our discussion in the previous two 
paragraphs, if wire labels of all GC-slots’ outputs have been generated, multiple slices 
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can be garbled simultaneously. As such, garbling the N×N matrix is transformed to a    
1-D vector which is mapped to GPU units. Later in this chapter, observations in this 
subchapter are implemented as cross-slice mapping policies (CSMP) for the generator 
and slice-by-slice policies for the evaluator. In the rest of this chapter, we first present 
the GPU-based gate garbler, which is the implementation at the GC-level. Then we 
discuss the DP-level implementation for the ED problem and the SW problem, 
respectively.  
4.1 GC-level: GPU-based Gate (De-) Garbler 
Recalling the garbling/de-garbling process of a gate, an arbitrary truth table entry 
Txy of a gate G is garbled as Encx,y (kc
z
) = H(ka
x
||kb
y
) XOR kc
z
, where H is the encryption 
function, ka
x
, kb
y
 and kc
z
 are wire labels, “||” is concatenation. Following Huang et al. 
[43], 80-bit wire label is adopted to meet the ultra-short security proposed in TASTY 
[40]. Choices of H are SHA-1 [43], SHA-256 [37], AES-256 supported by the AES-NI 
instruction set of Intel CPUs [58], or other cryptographic hash functions. In this work, 
we chose SHA-256 as H due to its similar cost of SHA-1 [22][80], and better secure 
strength than SHA-1. AES-256 is excluded because it is 3 times slower than SHA-1 on 
GPU [49]. As a result, Encx,y (kc
z
) is in the format of SHA-256(ka
x
 || kb
y
 || i) XOR kc
z
, 
where i is a 32-bit unique gate index in a garbled circuit, where (ka
x
 || kb
y
 || i) is a 192-bit 
block, and the output of Encx,y (kc
z
) a 256-bit digest. Similarly, the de-garbling function 
Dec(Encx,y (kc
z
)) is SHA-256(ka
e
 || kb
e
 || i) XOR Encx,y (kc
z
), where ka
e
, kb
e
 are wire labels 
obtained from OT or a de-garbling process for a predecessor gate. 
 28 
 
chaff
thread access Ai
banks 0 1 7 8 31
w[0~1] w[2~3] ...
memory tiers 
in each bank
GPU threads in a warp (32 threads)
......
A0 A1 A2
A0
A4
A8
A1
24
A3
w[0~1] w[0~1]
w[0~1] ... w[0~1]
w[14~15] chaff w[0~1]
A5
...
...
...
... w[0~1]
A9 A11
A7
... ...
A2
...
... w[0~1]... ...
... w[0~1]... ...
A6
A10
chaff
(b). Collision avoidance shared memory access model
(a) shared memory bank conflict in the naïve placement of W[0~15]
thread access Ai
banks 0 1 7 8 31
w[0~1] w[2~3] ...
memory tiers 
in each bank
GPU threads in a warp (32 threads)
......
A0 A1 A2
A0
A4
A1
24
A3
w[0~1] w[0~1]
w[0~1] ... w[0~1]
A5
...
...
...
A7
... ...
A2
...
... w[0~1]... ...
A6
bank conflicts
 
Figure 4.2 Optimization on Shared Memory Access 
The SHA-256 code base used in this research is PolarSSL [81]. When porting the 
code base to GPU, following adjustments are made: our initial analysis shows that one 
round of SHA-256 can be further divided into four steps, and each of which produces 16 
(32-bit) words W[0~15] based on the elements in W computed in the current and 
previous steps. Furthermore, in the end of each step, W[0~15] are used to update the 
eight 32-bit digest (cipher text). In the original code base, the four steps are computed 
together and thus it needs a four times larger variable W’[0~63]. We clearly partition the 
four steps and keep re-using W[0~15] in each step. As a result, the share memory usage 
per SHA256 instance is dropped to ¼ of the original version. 
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Overall, a total of 40 (32-bit) words of space are needed for each round. That is, 
when each thread runs an independent instance of SHA-256, 16 (32-bit) registers store 
W[0~15] in the current step, 8 (32-bit) registers store the digest, and one block of 16×32-
bit shared memory is assigned to each thread to store W[0~15] produced in the past step, 
the storage format of such a shared memory block per thread is illustrated in Figure 4.2 
(b). Here, each block (uint32 W[0~15]) resides on eight shared memory bank. 
It is noted that a strip of chaff spacer is inserted in the final version of memory 
access model. Figure 4.2 (a) illustrates the memory access pattern if the W[0~15] is 
placed into the shared memory without any optimization. In Figure 4.2 (a), it is found 
that, as all 32 threads in the same warp reads their own W with an identical offset, thread 
{i, i+4, i+8, i+12, i+16, i+20, i+24, i+28}(i=0,1,2,3) are trying to access different tiers (a 
low level GPU architecture) of the same memory bank simultaneously. When such a 
situation happens, GPU threads in a same warp will be stalled. This case is known as 
bank conflict. If W is placed in the share memory following the policy in Figure 4.2 (a), 
the actual degree of parallelism drops to 1/8 of the configuration. To eliminate the often 
hidden shared memory access conflicts, a strip of 64-bit chaff spacers is filled, one in the 
front of every four
th
-thread’s W[0~15]. This way, parallel memory accesses {Ai, Ai+4, 
Ai+8,…Ai+28} issued by threads i, i+4, i+8, …i+28 (i=0,1,2, 3) to read W[0~15] of the 
same offset in its own W array will access distinct memory banks with no conflict. 
Figure 4.2 (b) displays an example of offset j=0, and {A0, A4, A8… A28} read W[0]. 
To reduce the unnecessary off-chip memory access for reading the 192-bit input 
block and writing the 256-bit digest, the coalesce memory access scheme [36] is applied 
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as a minor optimization. Accessing off-chip memory usually brings a 1:100 performance 
degradation than on-chip memory. The bandwidth of the off-chip memory interface is 
256-bit in the Kepler GPU architecture. Taking the input block as an example, the 192-
bit input blocks from four threads, denoted as four uint32[6], are interleaved in the 
global memory space and occupies 3×256-bit. As such, as the four threads visit an 
arbitrary uint32[i] of their own 192-bit blocks with the same i, it costs only one global 
memory read. Although applying the coalesce memory access scheme needs extra 
computation cost for the storage format converting on the CPU side, our initial 
experiment results show that this scheme can bring 5% throughput enhancement for the 
gate garbler.  
Overall, each SHA-256 gate garbler thread uses 57 registers, where GK104 
allows up to 63 registers per thread. Global memory access only occurs when the gate 
garbler reads wire labels or writes the digest. Each SMX has 20 warps of GPU threads, 
and the degree of parallelism is 5120=8 SMX × 640 threads. Each SMX has 64KB on-
chip memory, partitioned as 48 KB shared memory plus 16 KB L1 cache. 41.25KB of 
the 48KB of shared memory is utilized to save W. Any attempt to assign more complete 
warps of thread will make the total shared memory size exceed the shared memory size 
boundary of GK104, it can be concluded that the gate garbler has fully utilized the 
shared memory resource.  
As a result, the latency of computing 10000 times SHA-256 on 5120 threads is 
304ms, here each SHA-256 instance reads in a block of 192 bits as the input. The 
throughput is 30.27Gbps. This performance result has included the GPU-CPU data 
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exchange time, and it is comparable to the result of SHA1 on GTX-580 [49]. As 
reference, Intel reported that their SHA256 could obtain 11.5 cycles/byte on a single 
core of Intel i7 2600 in 2012 [37], equivalent to 2.47Gbps. Next, we present our DP-
level design for the SFE-based Edit-Distance and Smith-Waterman problems. 
4.2 DP-level: Computing SFE-based Edit-Distance 
To design the parallel computing model at the DP level, the first task is analyzing 
the computation logic of the ED problem. The plain-text version ED problem can be 
described as follows: 
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Figure 4.3 The SFE Building Block (a GC-slot at DP[i][j]) for ED 
1. The two input strings A[N] and B[N] are from the generator and the evaluator 
respectively;  
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2. Solving the ED problem is essentially computing an (N+1)×(N+1) DP matrix 
from top-left to right-bottom. And each slot DP[i][j] (i,j [0,N]) is computed 
as: 
DP[i][0] = i, DP[0][j] = j, or 
if i,j [1,N], DP[i][j] = (Y > X) ? (X+1) : (Y+t) 
where t = (A[i] ≠ B[j]), X=min(DP[i-1][j] , DP[i][j-1]), and Y=DP[i-1][j-1] 
[43].  
When using the SHDL to describe the SFE-based ED problem, “DP[i][j] = (Y > 
X) ? (X+1) : (Y+t)” can be summarized as a combination of one “equal(A[i], B[j])” GC, 
two “min(x,y)” GCs, and one “add(x,1)” GC. Such a combination is illustrated in Figure 
4.3. In Figure 4.3, the GC-slot represents the privacy-preserving computing logic for 
computing the entry DP[i][j], which is composed of two Min_of_2 circuits (Min_of_2 
and Min_of_2_mux), one Char_EQ circuit (compute t), and one Add_One circuit. 
[43] had already presented the optimal structure of one GC-slot, that is, GC-slots 
do not have a unified structure, instead, the complexity of a CG-slot is closely dependent 
to the actual bit-widths of inputs. However, some details for inter-connecting GCs within 
one GC-slot are not clear presented in their work. For example, two inputs of one 
Min_of_2 GC are forced to have equal bit-width to ease the difficulty of GC design, but 
the Min_of_2 GC’s inputs DP[i-1][j] and DP[i][j-1] may have different bit-width at 
certain slot{i, j}. In [43][44], alignment of widths of inputs for one GC was ignored.  
We give the bit-width alignment scheme based on two 1-bit extension wires (see 
Figure 4.3) for {DP[i-1][j], DP[i][j-1]}, and {X, Y} here. Knowing that the maximum 
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value of an arbitrary GC-slot DP[i][j] is max(i, j), the maximum possible values of 
inputs and intermediate results in a GC slot are listed in Table 4.1. This table is helpful 
to identify when the bit-width alignment scheme is necessary for the input wires of 
circuit Min_of_2 and circuit Min_of_2_mux. 
Table 4.1 Maximum Possible Values of Inputs and Intermediate Results in DP[i][j] 
 DP[i][j-1] 
(width = m3) 
DP[i-1][j] 
(width = m2) 
X (width = m4) Y (width = m1) 
i < j max(i,j-1) = j-1 max(i-1,j) = j min(i-1,j) = j-1 max(i-1,j-1) = j-1 
i == j max(i,j-1) = i max(i-1,j) = j min(i,j) = i max(i-1,j-1) = i-1 
i > j max(i,j-1) = i max(i-1,j) = i-1 min(i,i-1) = i-1 max(i-1,j-1) = i-1 
The first two columns of Table 4.1, representing DP[i-1][j] and DP[i][j-1], are 
values of inputs of one Min_of_2 circuit. The difference of input value m3=m2 – 1(m2=m3 
– 1) is true when i<j (i>j). As such, the extension wire is activated for DP[i][j-1] (DP[i-
1][j]) when i<j (i>j), and j (i) equals power of 2. Similarly, the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 columns, 
representing X and Y, are values of inputs of the other Min_of_2 circuit which has one 
additional 1-bit “less or greater” signal output. The difference of input value m1= m4 – 1 
is true when i==j. As such, the extension wire is activated for Y when i==j, and i is 
power of 2. 
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4.2.1 GPU Mapping Policies 
Next, we present how thousands of GC-slots of the SFE-based ED problem are 
parallel computed on the Kepler GPU architecture. Recalling the key observation 
presented at the beginning of this chapter, for the generator, garbling a GC-slot on a slice 
Si only needs to re-use wire labels associated output wires of GC-slots on predecessor 
slices Si-2 and Si-1; And for the evaluator, de-garbling a GC-slot on a slice Si needs to re-
use decrypted results of GC-slots on predecessor slices Si-2 and Si-1. Due to the difference 
of inter-dependency of computation steps for the two principals, their GPU mapping 
policies are designed separately. 
On the generator side, the cross slice mapping policy (CSMP) is adopted as 
follows: the CSMP partitions the DP matrix into multiple tasks, each of which aims to 
fill up 5120 GPU gate garbler threads to maximize the speedup factor. In one task, each 
GC-slot is assigned to one GPU thread. Before the current task starts, all paired wire 
labels for GC-slots in this task are prepared. The CSMP for the first task is illustrated in 
Figure 4.4.  
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Figure 4.4 The Generator's Resource Mapping Policy: CSMP 
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Figure 4.4 shows that the first task task[0] contains 5120 GC-slots, which is from 
slice 1, 2, 3, … up to a fraction of slice 101. As such, task[0] has fully loaded the GPU 
gate garbler. Furthermore, to facilitate the synchronization between the two principals, 
the direction of counting the 5120 GC-slots is slice-by-slice, not from top-left to bottom-
right. When GPU runs the 5120 GC slots in lock-step, each GPU thread garbles its 
corresponding GC-slot gate by gate for the entire GC-slot. In other words, the inter-
dependency within one GC-slot is easily satisfied because the logic of each GC-slot is 
serially garbled by one GPU thread.  
The challenge of CSMP is the management of wire labels. To support large 
problem sizes, generating wire labels for all GC-slots in the DP matrix at the beginning 
is inacceptable. Instead, it is preferred to generate wire labels at the beginning of each 
task. However, for certain wire labels, such a preference is impractical. For example, 
wire labels that represent output wires of GC-slots may be used in two consecutive tasks, 
and thus the successor task does not need to re-generate these wire labels. Another 
example is the wire labels that map to the input string A[N] and B[N], which are used by 
all tasks. As a result, it is necessary to differentiate types of wire labels according to their 
life-time. 
Wire labels are classified into three major types LO, LI, and LG. Referring to Figure 
4.3, LO represents the set of paired labels for wires of a GC-slot’s outputs. LI represents 
the set of paired labels for wires internal to a GC-slot and not connected to other GC-
slots. LG represents miscellaneous types of paired labels, and they are treated as a 
“global” set to simplify memory management. Classification of these three groups of 
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wire labels is not only important to efficiently use of the GPU memory space, but also 
critical to synchronous accesses of wire labels by parallel GPU threads. LO and LI are pre-
assigned at initialization of a new task, but LG at initialization of the whole SFE system. 
LO and LI are overwritten if they are associated with an XOR gate’s output [57] by a 
calculation result based on the XOR gate’s inputs’ wire labels. Even though some LO and 
LI need to be overwritten during execution, they are still pre-assigned to simplify the wire 
label generation function at negligible costs.  
Overwriting of labels in LO has to occur before garbling of a task. In most cases, 
wire labels in LI are overwritten during garbling because no other GC-slots depend to 
them. However, if a wire label in LO is dependent to some LI, these wire labels in LI need 
to be overwritten before overwriting of LO. For instance, the output of an XOR gate G1 is 
the input of another XOR gate G2, and the output of G2 is also the GC-slot’s output. Here, 
wire labels associated with G1’s (G2’s) output are in LI(LO). Both overwriting of labels for 
G1 and overwriting of labels for G2 should be done before garbling of a task, 
furthermore, the former overwriting needs to be done before the latter overwriting.  
Next, miscellaneous cases related to LG are listed: (1) the first case is the GC-slots 
on the edge of the DP-matrix (excluding the edge DP[i][0] and DP[0][j] since they are 
constant values). The two edges can be represented as DP[1][j], or DP[i][1], i.e., the 
second row and second column of the DP matrix. In these GC-slots, the Min_of_2_mux 
circuit’s input DP[i-1][j-1] is a real value rather than wire labels from other GC-slots 
because i or j=1. Furthermore, some gates in these Min_of_2_mux circuits are only 
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dependent to inputs wires of DP[i-1][j-1]. Garbling of these gates can be skipped, and 
these gates could be treated as the generator’s inputs. As such, we directly assign paired 
wire labels to the outputs of these garbled gates. (2) the second case of LG is in the 
Add_one circuit. As listed in Table 4.1, the maximum possible value of the input of the 
Add_one circuit equals j-1 (i-1) if i < j (i > j), and the maximum possible value of its 
output is j (i). When j (i) is power of 2, the bit-width of the output is 1-bit greater than 
that of the input. For this case, an overflow bit is needed for correctly representing the 
output value. (3) the third case is the extension wires aforementioned. (4) in the end, the 
forth case is wire labels mapped to the generator’s input A[N] and the evaluator’s input 
B[N]. They are global because they need to be used by multiple GC-slots, and they are 
generated in the system initialization phase. 
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Figure 4.5 The Evaluator's GPU Resource Mapping Policy: slice-by-slice 
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On the evaluator side, a GC-slot DP[i][j] can only be de-garbled after the 
evaluator receives de-garbled results of slots DP[i-1][j], DP[i][j-1] and DP[i-1][j-1], 
which have been de-garbled in the previous two slices. As such, a slice-by-slice GPU 
resource mapping policy is proposed for the de-garbling process on the evaluator side. 
Figure 4.5 illustrates a snapshot of the de-garbling process of slice 101. In this figure, 
GC-slots in slice 101 are mapped to GPU de-garbler threads. This mapping happens 
after the generator side completes its tasks 0 and 1 since the generator’s task 0 does not 
contain all GC-slots of slice 101. Same as the garbling process, each GPU thread de-
garbles its corresponding GC-slot gate by gate, until all gates in its GC-slot is de-
garbled. If a slice contains more than 5120 GC-slots, the mapping and de-garbling 
process is repeated until all GC-slots in the slice are de-garbled. 
4.2.2 Memory Management and Pipelined Scheduling 
While the GPU is garbling/de-garbling GC-slots, CPU is not idle. Instead, CPU 
are utilized to scheduling the execution of next task (slice) on the generator (evaluator) 
side, and maintaining memory chunks associated with next task (slice). To support the 
large-scale SFE-based ED problem and SW problem on commodity computers and 
GPUs, setting a moderate memory boundary (around 4GB on CPU, and 2GB on GPU) 
for our parallel computing model is necessary. To meet such a memory boundary, the 
static memory management policy is proposed as follows: 
On the generator side, we observe that repetitive allocation and release of GPU 
memory for the LI type wire labels are unnecessary because the host control thread can 
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re-use one device memory chunk in multiple kernel functions. In other words, if the 
maximum device memory usage per task has been correctly estimated, then all tasks 
could repetitively utilize this memory block since they serially dispatched to the GPU 
device. The same memory management policy can be applied to the host memory, which 
only stores the encryption results of block-cipher operations as intermediate results for 
the generator. The memory allocation only happens in the system initialization phase, 
and the memory release operation only occurs in the system de-construction phase. As a 
result, the numbers of allocation and release operations in the host and GPU memory 
spaces are minimized. 
Due to the slice-by-slice policy for de-garbling GC-slots on the evaluator side, 
the de-garbling result per slice does not need to be maintained in the GPU memory space 
until the whole execution ends. Instead, only de-garbling results of the latest three slices 
are kept in a separate memory chunk for the next slice. On the generator side, to simplify 
the synchronization between computation and network transferring, all computation 
results are copied to a separate memory block for network transferring. And then the 
memory space for storing computation results of the current task is ready for being re-
used by the next task. 
A scheduling step is a process on the CPU that sets up start-offsets of wire labels 
of LI, LO and LG, and start-offsets of output results for each GC of each GC-slot in the 
current task (slice) on the generator (evaluator) side. To locate these start-offsets, it is 
necessary to collect information of GCs from their SHDL code. The objective of this 
parser is two-fold. First, it collects GC information, such as the number of LI, LO and LG, 
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the number of output entries and the dependency among gates within one GC. Second, by 
using collected information, it assesses the maximum memory usage of a task (slice) in 
the whole SFE-based protocol. Such a parsing process happens in the system 
initialization phase. And right now, this parsing process is hard coded in our system.  
After this parsing process, there is another necessary preparation step in the 
initialization phase. This preparation step needs to generate static structural information 
for each GC-slot. It records which version of the compacted GCs is used in each GC-slot, 
how many wire labels of LI, LO and LG are consumed in each GC-slot, and how many 
output entries will be generated by the block-cipher operations for each GC-slot. It also 
marks several flags for the utilization of wire labels LG, for example, the overflow flag for 
the Add_one GC. With the structural information of GCs and GC-slots, computing the 
start-offset of wire labels of LI, LO, LG, or entries of output results for each GC is simply 
accumulating offsets of that of the specific GC-slots, and the relative start-offsets of GC 
in the GC-slot.  
These extension and overflow flags are critical to maintain the correctness of the 
logic, however, a general solution that uses conditional statement to check these flags for 
each GC and each gate during garbling/de-garbling may bring a large number of branch 
divergences on GPU. As such, this is a trade-off between the generality and performance 
of the system. Because this work focuses on the ED problem and the SW problem, our 
code is highly associated with the structure of GC-slots for the SFE-based ED problem 
and the SFE-based SW problem, so that a “if-else” statement for checking extension or 
overflow flags are triggered only when it is necessary. 
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Figure 4.6 The Pipelined Garbling & De-garbling Process (ED) 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the pipelined processing flows between the garbling and de-
garbling processes for the ED problem. On the generator side, the three CPU threads are 
a scheduler, a GPU controller and a communicator. The generator’s step 1 (the 
evaluator’s step 3), named as “scheduling” are the scheduling step presented in last 
several paragraphs. When the scheduling work for the current task is completed, the 
scheduler pushes the current task to a queue shared with the GPU controller. Then the 
GPU controller revises slots’ output wire label pairs for XOR gates as the step 3 (of the 
generator), and runs gate garbling on GPU. Meanwhile, the scheduler starts the 
scheduling step for the next task. Once the garbling process completes, the 
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communicator transfers encrypted truth tables, encrypted permute-and-encrypt bits [65], 
and wire labels for extension wires (only one of a pair that associates with value 0) used 
in the current task, to the evaluator. 
On the evaluator side, the two CPU threads are a communicator and a 
scheduler+GPU controller. Its scheduler+GPU controller first determines how many 
slices are ready for de-garbling after receiving the encryption data of the latest task. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates an example that the most recent received task, task 0, contains 
multiple slices. As such, the scheduling step and the GPU-based de-garbling step are 
invoked multiple times, each time for one slice in the task 0. 
Table 4.2 Pipeline Execution Time Break Down (ED) 
Exec Time Generator Evaluator 
1. SFE System initialization 6.92s 2.94s 
2. Scheduling 6.06s 23.04s 
3. GPU garbling/de-garbling (without 
GPU-CPU data copy) 
1062.95s (0.218 
s/task) 
136.55s 
(0.014s /slice) 
4. CPU-GPU data copy, resource mgmt 99.13s 50.21s 
5. Total computing latency 1520s 345.3s 
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4.2.3 Experiment Result and Analysis 
Following the previous study [43], we select the test case 5000×5000 8-bit 
alphabet ED problem, which is composed of 1.88 billion non-free gates, as the test case 
to evaluate the performance of our parallel computing model on a CPU-GPU system. 
The generator runs 4883 tasks on a Xeon E5504 CPU at 2.00GHz with 16GB memory 
plus a GTX 680, and the evaluator runs 9999 slices on an Intel i7-3770K CPU at 3.5GHz 
with 8GB memory plus a GTX680 GPU. 
Table 4.2 lists the break down of execution times for major pipeline steps of the 
test case. Row (2) matches the generator’s step 1 (in Figure 4.6), and the evaluator’s step 
2+3. Row (3) matches the generator’s step 2+3+4, and the evaluator’s step 4. Row (5) 
lists the total computing latencies (1520s, 345.3s), which does not include networking 
transmission latencies, nor the system initialization time. There is a difference between 
the total computing latencies (row 5), and the sum of rows 2, 3, and 4. Such a difference 
is mainly spent in a compaction process of the garbling outputs. In this compaction 
process, encrypted truth table entries are compressed to eliminate bubbles caused by our 
static memory management policy. This step is necessary to reduce network transferring 
cost. And on the evaluator side, the time difference is spent in a reverse process of the 
generator’s compaction process, which normalizes lengths of the garbling outputs. 
In Table 4.2, it is also shown that the time spent in garbling is much longer than 
that for de-garbling. It fits the expectation since the cost of de-garbling a gate is reduced 
to 12.5% (for a 3-bit in 1-bit out gate) or 25% (for a 2-bit in 1-bit out gate) of garbling a 
gate when the permute-and-encrypt technique [65] is applied. Another reason would be 
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that, in most cases, the computing logic of slots in one task is much more diverse (uses 
more different versions of the Min_of_2, Min_of_2_mux or Add_One circuits) than that 
in one slice. Such diversity results in greater synchronization cost under the SIMT 
architecture. 
The computation between the two principals is also pipelined. In this test case, 
the generator usually completes its total computing tasks when the evaluator completes 
93% of de-garbling slices. The overall running time, excluding networking delays, to 
compute the 5000×5000 test case is 1555 seconds, which translates to a throughput of 
1.209×10
6
 gates per second. Compared with the computing speed of 96000 gates per 
second [43], the acceleration rate is 12.5 folds. 
Table 4.3 Major Memory Utilization on the Generator Side (ED) 
 Generator side memory usage 
LG for DP[1][j] and DP[i][1] 1.1MB (host & GPU) 
LG for overflow 0.3MB (host & GPU) 
circuits structural info of DP[i][j] 286MB (host) 
relative start addresses of LO, LI, or LG 
for each GC-slot in one task 
0.3MB (host & GPU) 
LI for each GC-slot in one task 12.5 MB (GPU) 
garbling output of one task 80MB (host & GPU) 
LO of GC-slots in latest three slices in 
the previous task 
3.8MB(GPU) 
network transferring queue 3.2GB (host) 
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Table 4.3 illustrates the major host & GPU memory consumption on the 
generator side. As shown in Table 4.3, the major memory utilization is storing circuit 
structural information for the 5000×5000 GC-slots. Comparing with that, the 
computation-related memory utilization for one task is negligible. In sum, the overall 
memory utilization excluding network transferring-related part is around 400MB. Due to 
the bursty of garbling outputs pushing into the network transferring queue as we 
observed, an empirical memory upper bound 3.2GB is set for the network transferring 
queue to prevent memory exhaustion. After counting in the network transferring 
memory cost, the total memory usage is around 3.6GB, which is acceptable for personal 
computers or small servers. 
4.3 DP-level: Computing SFE-based Smith-Waterman 
In this subchapter, we present the DP-level design for the SFE-based Smith-
Waterman (SW) problem, especially the part different from that for the SFE-based ED 
problem. At the beginning of this subchapter, we present the structure of a GC-slot in the 
DP matrix of the SW problem. Our revised SW algorithm is displayed as Figure 4.7. The 
algorithm inputs are two genome sequences α and β from the generator and the evaluator 
respectively, a function gap(x) = a + b x (where a and b are public co-efficients) and a 2-
dimensional score matrix. Our selection of gap(x) and score matrix follows [65], that is, 
gap(x) = -12-7x and the score matrix BLOSUM62 [41]. There are 20 types of genome 
enumerated in BLOSUM62, and thus the bit-width of each symbol in α and β is 5. 
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Smith-Waterman(α, β, gap, score):
1: for i from 0 to α.length:
2:     DP[i][0] = 0;
3: for j from 0 to β.length:
4:    DP[0][j] = 0; (j=[0, β.length])
5: for i from 1 to α.length:
6:     for j from 1 to β.length:
7:         signed tmp = DP[i-1][j-1] + score[α[i]][β[j]];
8:         m = 0;
9:         for o from 1 to i, and then 1 to j:
10:             m = max(m, signed (DP[x][y]-|gap(o)|) ),
                here {x,y}={i-o,j}or{i,j-o}, DP[x][y] >= |gap(o)|
11:       DP[i][j] = max(m, signed tmp); 
 
             Figure 4.7 The Revised Smith-Waterman Algorithm 
For convenience of parallelization, we make several small revisions to further 
partition the SW algorithm into steps (lines 7 and 11) of O(N
2
) time complexity and 
steps (lines 8-10) of O(N
3
) time complexity. Line 7 includes a lookup function that 
generates a score from the score matrix, and an addition function that sums results of 
DP[i-1][j-1] and the newly generated score. It is noticeable that the score would be a 
negative value, and thus the sum may also be negative. Therefore, the addition function 
needs to export a 1-bit sign flag as part of its output. For lines 8-10, the original version 
of SW algorithm differentiates the dependency among GC-slots in the same column and 
the same row, and separates the logic into two for loops (one for column, the other for 
row). Here, we consider them as the homogeneous inter-dependency with different 
sources of wire labels. This loop can be further translated as a sequence of 
{signed_Subtraction, Max} circuits. And such a sequence in an arbitrary GC-slot is 
denoted as SEQ. Line 11 only includes one Max circuit which compares the result of 
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SEQ and that of line 7. Noting that the value of an arbitrary DP[i][j] should always 
greater or equal to 0, this final Max circuit does need to export a sign flag. 
At runtime, there is one opportunity for further optimization. Line 9 in Figure 4.7 
indicates that the original length of SEQ is i+j. However, one node (DP[x][y] – gap(o)) 
in the SEQ can be skipped if it is negative for sure. Checking whether (DP[x][y] – 
gap(o)) of SEQ is negative does not break the privacy. According to the computation 
nature of the plain-text version of SW, the maximum possible value of DP[x][y] is 
min(x,y) × SMAX, where SMAX is the maximum positive value in BLOSUM62. The 
other operand of the subtraction, gap(x) = -12-7x, is also public. As such, if the 
maximum possible value of DP[x][y] ≤ gap(o), a node (DP[x][y] – gap(o)) is skipped. 
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Figure 4.8 The SFE Building Block (a GC-slot at DP[i][j]) for SW 
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The structure of a GC-slot DP[i][j] is shown in Figure 4.8. It includes a 
scoreLookup circuit, a signed_Addition circuit, a sequence of unsigned_Max(m, 
signed_Subtraction(DP[x][y], |gap(o)|)) circuits, and an unsigned_Max(m, tmp) circuit. 
The gap(o) is treated as the generator’s input wires since it is independent with the 
evaluator.  
In Figure 4.8, colors for of LI, LO and LG follow the color usage in last subchapter, 
but LO is further divided to two different types of wire labels, denoted by LSO and LCO: LSO 
represents the set of paired labels for wires of GC-slots’ outputs, LCO the set of paired 
labels for wires of circuits’ outputs within GC-slots. Separating LCO and LSO is necessary 
to construct a more fine-grained parallel computing model for SW. LI represents the set 
of paired labels for wires within circuits. Furthermore, LI also include labels for 
extension wires for Max in SEQ, since the number of these wires for all GC-slots in the 
entire DP matrix is too large to be kept as global wire labels. Based on the same reason, 
if a garbled gate in signed_Subtraction does not accept any input from the evaluator, it 
are treated as a wire in LI. LG includes sets of wires labels for the overflow bits of the 
signed_Addition circuit of all GC-slots in the DP matrix, and the evaluator’s input β[N]. 
Special cases are GC-slots DP[1][j] and DP[i][1]. Their GC-slot structure can be 
simplified as one scoreLookup circuit because DP[i-1][j-1]=0, and the outputs of Max 
circuits are always 0. 
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4.3.1 GPU Mapping Policies 
The GPU resource mapping policies for the SFE-based SW problem is similar to 
that for the SFE-based ED problem. That is, the task partition of the cross-slice-mapping 
(CSMP) policy for the generator, and the partition of slice-by-slice policy for the 
evaluator are the same as that for the ED problem. For example, the task[0] on the 
generator side also contains 5120 GC-slots. And on the evaluator side, GC-slots are de-
garbled slice by slice. However, the policies for the SFE-based SW problem are more 
fined-grained than that for the SFE-based ED problem because the former problem has 
much more complicated computation structures of its GC-slots. 
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Figure 4.9 The Generator's CSMP (SW) for (a) Line 7 and (b) Lines 8-11 in Figure 4.7 
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Figure 4.9 (a) illustrates a snapshot of task[0]. It is clear that only {scoreLookup, 
signed_Addition} circuits for each GC-slot in task[0] are contained in Figure 4.9 (a). 
This part has O(N
2
) time complexity, and therefore, each GC-slot has only one pair of 
{scoreLookup, signed_Addition} circuits. Next step is garbling the the O(N
3
) time 
complexity part, in a manner of slice-by-slice and within the scope of one task. Taking 
the task[0] as an example, for each slice in current task, we calculate the number of 
paired {signed_Subtraction, Max} circuits of all GC-slots per slice. Then, each pair of 
{signed_Subtraction, Max} circuits of the current slice is mapped to one GPU gate 
garbler thread. Figure 4.9 (b) uses the 100
th
 slice in task[0] as an example and illustrates 
the mapping policy for the O(N
3
) time complexity part (lines 8-10) and line 11. 
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Figure 4.10 The Evaluator’s slice-by-slice Mapping Policy (SW) for (a) Line 7 and (b)  
Lines 8-11 in Figure 4.7 
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The evaluator also has a fine-grained slice-by-slice resource mapping policy, 
which does not only separate the de-garbling processes of the O(N
2
) time complexity 
part and the O(N
3
) time complexity part, but also separates the de-garbling processes of 
signed_Subtraction circuits and Max circuits in all GC-slots of a slice. Figure 4.10 (a) 
illustrates the slice-by-slice mapping policy of 100 {scoreLookup, signed_Addition (if 
applicable)} circuits in the 100
th
 slice to 100 GPU threads. Then, as shown in Figure 
4.10 (b), for all signed_Subtraction circuits of all GC-slots in the 100
th
 slice, each circuit 
is mapped to one GPU thread because they are independent of each other. Later, in the 
same slice, all Max circuits of one GC-slot are mapped to one GPU thread to enforce 
serial de-garbling of Max circuits.  
4.3.2 Pipelined Scheduling 
The assignment of wire labels for the SFE-based SW problem is also slightly 
different from that for the SFE-based ED problem. LCO and LI are pre-assigned at 
initialization of a new task, but LSO and LG at initialization of the SFE system. LSO is 
treated as global variables during the entire privacy-preserving computing because their 
dependency crosses the DP matrix. The static memory allocation for LSO, LCO, LG and LI is 
similar to its counterpart in the ED problem. The only difference is the assessment of the 
maximum memory usage for saving LCO and LI for line 7 (in Figure 4.7) is per task, and 
LCO and LI for line 7-11 (in Figure 4.7) per slice. 
Comparing with the SFE-based ED problem, the structure of GC-slots for the 
SFE-based SW problem contains richer flags: first, because all unsigned_Max circuits 
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within one GC slot need to have the same I/O bit width, extension-wire flag is necessary 
for each circuit in the sequence of {unsigned_Max} circuits. Second, it saves start-
offsets of LCO associated with unsigned_Max, signed_Subtraction and signed_Addition 
circuits’ output wires are contained. Third, each unsigned_Max circuit saves two offsets, 
one points to its predecessor unsigned_Max circuit in the SEQ, the other points to the 
signed_Subtraction circuit that passes its output to the unsigned_Max circuit. 
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Figure 4.11 The Pipelined Garbling & De-garbling Process (SW) 
Figure 4.11 illustrates the runtime pipeline of the garbling and de-garbling 
process for the SW problem. On the generator side, the step 3 overwrites paired wire 
label that map to outputs of signed_Addition circuits. Then the step 4 garbles 
scoreLookup plus signed_Addition circuits in the task[0]. Meanwhile, the step 6 
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schedules the garbling of the {signed_Subtraction, unsigned_Max} circuit sequence 
SEQ for all slices in the task[0]. Then, step 7 garbles the SEQ slice-by-slice. 
On the other hand, the evaluator’s step 2 schedules the de-garbling process for 
{scoreLookup, signed_Addition} slice by slice, and step 4 for the {unsigned_Max, 
signed_Subtraction} sequence. Step 3, 5, 6 de-garble {scoreLookup plus 
signed_Addition}, the signed_Subtraction circuits sequence, and the unsigned_Max 
circuits sequences respectively. In Figure 4.11, the benefit of pipelined computing line 7 
and line 8-11 (in Figure 4.7) can be easily high-lighted. That is, part of the latency for 
transferring garbled result of SEQ of all GC-slots in one task is covered by the slice-by-
slice de-garbling {scoreLookup, signed_Addition}. 
4.3.3 Experiment Results and Analysis 
Follow previous studies [43][52], we select the 60×60 SW problem as the test 
case to verify the efficiency of our system. Table 4.4 lists the break down of execution 
time on the generator and the evaluator side. In Table 4.4, it shows that a very large 
proportion of execution time is spent in the garbling (de-garbling) process of Max 
circuits on the generator (evaluator) side. It meets the expectation because the amount of 
Max circuits is huge, and all Max circuits within one GC-slot have to be de-garbled 
sequentially. Garbling and de-garbling process of signed_Subtract circuits takes much 
less execution time due to the independency of signed_Subtract within one GC-slot. In 
this test case, the execution times of garbling and de-garbling the time complexity O(N
2
) 
part are trivial.  
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Table 4.4 Execution Time Break Down (SW) 
Exec Time Generator Evaluator 
SFE system initialization 2.6s 4.51s 
Scheduling 0.0176 0.014s 
garbling & de-garbling(scoreLookup) 0.02s 0.0018s 
garbling & de-garbling(signed_Addition) 0.044s 0.037s 
garbling & de-garbling(signed_Subtract) 0.45s 0.091s 
garbling & de-garbling(Max) 2.7s 8.5s 
Total computing latency 5.6s 8.64s 
The time latency from the generator’s task 0 to the evaluator’s de-garbling of 
slice 119 is 9.69 seconds, and the total computing latency (two initialization phases + 
9.69, excluding networking cost) is 16.79 seconds. This result represents a 24.7x 
acceleration factor over the computing time (415 seconds) for the same 60×60 SW 
problem reported in Huang et al. [43]. In terms of the memory usage, for the studied 
case, it took about 40MB to store encrypted truth table entries and permute-and-encrypt 
bits. The statically allocated memory for saving all paired wire labels of GC-slots’ and 
circuits’ outputs is less than 4MB. 
4.4 Summary 
According to the experimental result reported in subchapter 4.2 and 4.3, it can be 
concluded that the GPU-based parallel computing model proposed in this dissertation 
can effectively accelerate the SFE-based ED and the SFE-based SW problems. 
Comparing with the CPU-based SHA-256 version reported on Intel i7 CPU [37], our 
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GPU-based SHA-256 version in this work has roughly 3 folds throughput enhancement. 
Comparing with the CPU-version benchmark reported in [43], which parallel computed 
the SFE-based ED and SW problems on two computes with Intel Duo E8400 3GHz 
CPUs, our 10+ folds speed up rates can be due to reasons as follows: first, when 
mapping the computing structure of the SFE-based ED problem and SFE-based SW 
problem to the GPU-based gate garbler, the degree of parallelism provided by the gate 
garbler is fully utilized by the generator, and is maximally utilized by the evaluator while 
it needs to satisfy the inter-dependency among slices. Second, the pipeline mechanism 
causes few idle cycles on the CPU-GPU architecture. Third, the static memory 
management policy eliminates unnecessary memory allocation and release in both host 
and GPU memory spaces. 
The CSMP and slice-by-slice GPU resource mapping policies are general 
policies for an arbitrary problem size N of SFE-based DP problems which satisfy the 
wavefront parallel patterns. Our experiment results further show that, if the time 
complexity reaches O(N
3
), fine-grained mapping policies that partition time complexity 
O(N
3
) part and O(N
2
) part of a DP instance have better chance than coarse-grained 
counterparts to fully utilize the degree of parallelism provided by the GPU-based gate-
garbler. Knowing the “general purpose” computing nature of the SFE protocol, our 
design experiences is also helpful for system design of other SFE-based problems. 
A tool chain for an automatic execution process of SFE-based DP problems on 
GPU is the future purpose. Currently, the runtime execution part is automatic, but the 
offline part is still manual. To support an automatic offline process, a new language is 
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needed to define the inter-dependency among GCs within one GC-slot of the DP matrix, 
and a new parser is needed to convert both SHDL-based GC files and the inter-
dependency among GC-slots to structural information in memory. 
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CHAPTER V  
PARALLEL ECC ALGORITHMS ON GPU 
 
In this chapter, we present the parallel computing models of two ECC 
algorithms, point multiplication and bilinear pairing, on the contemporary GPU 
architecture. To study the computing requirement of point multiplication and bilinear 
pairing, we first study how to utilize ECC-based PSI and SH in the health-care cloud 
service SAPPHIRE [77] to protect the health records of patients (privacy information) 
from the cloud service provider. 
Four roles of SAPPHIRE are formally defined as follows: the patient(s) Bob, the 
clinic(s) Alice, the cloud service provider (CSP), and the request routing server (RRS). 
An instance of the SH protocol is called when Bob authenticates a request from Alice, or 
the RRS authenticates a request from Bob or Alice. As a 1-to-N server setting, the RRS 
may need to authenticate a large number of clients (Alice or Bob) in a short time 
interval. A PSI instance is called when Alice queries Bob’s health record from the CSP. 
When such a query occurs, the CSP first sends the RRS a large number of encrypted 
health records, in which only one of the records is Bob’s. And then Alice runs a PSI 
instance with the RRS to receive Bob’s health record without telling the RRS which 
record it is interested in. In one PSI instance, each encrypted health records on the RRS 
side triggers a number of point multiplication on both the RRS side and the Alice side. 
Therefore, when the RRS meets bursts of urgent PSI or SH transactions in an emergency 
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response situation, it requires a solution that is capable to handle a large volume of PSI 
and SH transactions timely. 
For security considerations, it is assumed that the server can be compromised, 
and it is unclear that GPU forbids other host processes to read the GPU memory. 
Therefore, when designing utilization scenario for GPU-based point multiplication and 
bilinear pairing, only the public computation are considered. On the RRS, the two inputs 
of bilinear pairing are the CSP/customer/clinic's public key and a group secret (a large 
integer) encrypted via ECC point multiplication. Both inputs are public data and 
therefore they can be safely computed on a server without privacy concern.  
In the rest of this chapter, we first analyze the PSI and SH protocols used in 
SAPPHIRE. Next, we present the parallel computing model of multi-precision 
arithmetic operations, which are fundamental functions for both ECC algorithms. Then, 
we discuss optimization techniques applied for high-level arithmetic operations in both 
ECC algorithms. And then, the experimental results are presented. In the end, the major 
bottlenecks of parallelized ECC algorithms on contemporary GPU architecture are 
analyzed. 
5.1 Computation Requirements in PSI and SH 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the authentication process between the RRS and Alice. For 
simplicity, Figure 5.1 only illustrates part of the authentication process which involves 
bilinear pairing: 
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As a prior process occurred before launching an SH session between Alice and 
the RRS, Alice had negotiated a group secret ssa with the RRS when it was registered in 
this cloud service, and the RRS returned sR = [ssa] PR to Alice as the registration result. 
In this prior process, the RRS did not directly return ssa to prevent Alice from guessing 
how a group secret is generated. 
Request
Routing 
Server 
(RRS)
Clinic Alice
personal ID: “Alice-RRS-Session”, maps to 
an elliptic curve point PA (PA is public)
resA =  e(sR, PA) =  e([ssa] PR,  PA)
an elliptic point sR = [ssa] PR
Authenticated Clinics 
...
...
Alice ssa
...
...
PA
...
...
Secret HandShaking
resRRS =  e(PA, [ssa] PR)
personal ID: “RRS-Alice-Session”, 
maps to an elliptic curve point PR (PR 
is public)
Alice knows sR in the prior process
 
Figure 5.1 The Secret Handshake between Alice and the RRS 
Then, as shown in Figure 5.1, an SH session starts between Alice and the RRS. 
In Figure 5.1, PR is an elliptic curve point mapped from the RRS’s personal ID. 
Similarly, Alice also has a point PA associated with its ID. These personal ID can be 
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arbitrary strings, and hence do not necessarily associate with their identities such as the 
full name, the driver license No., or the MAC address. In an SH session, Alice computes 
a pairing function e(sR, PA) = e([ssa] PR, PA); on the other hand, the RRS computes 
another pairing function e(PA, [ssa] PR). According to the bilinear property e([a] P, Q) = 
e(P, [a] Q), if and only if the two principals share a common group secret ssa, results of 
the two pairing functions can be the same. 
For the case that the RRS authenticates different clinics in a short time interval, 
several observations are drawn as follows. First, these authentication requests are 
independent to each other. Second, on the RRS side, the code path of the pairing 
function is determined by the order of the select elliptic curve, not the inputs PA and [ssa] 
PR. And hence, when all players in the system use the same elliptic curve for SH, 
different bilinear pairing instances on the RRS have the same code path, and hence fit 
the restriction of “single instruction” in the SIMT architecture. 
Next, we present the utilization of PSI in SAPPHAIRE. A PSI session is called 
when the RRS returns the patient Bob’s health record to the clinic Alice. The purpose of 
using PSI is protecting Bob’s health record from a carious RRS who may assess Bob’s 
health status based on clinics’ requests, or an unauthorized Alice who wants to guess the 
storage structure of health records on the CSP. In order to protect the privacy of Bob, the 
CSP will return k health records to the RRS, and then Alice runs a PSI session with the 
RRS to select one health record. No matter the result of the PSI session, Alice does not 
know any information of other health records, and the RRS does not know which record 
is matched by the Alice. If Alice is authorized to access Bob’s record, then the PSI 
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session will return it Bob’s record, and both Alice and the RRS know a unique match 
occurs; otherwise, the PSI session indicates that nothing is matched and the RRS rejects 
Alice’s query.  
encrypted health-record of BobEnc(j)
...
Enc(k)
......
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Inputs:
kDB is a large integer,
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rA1 and rA2 are two large integers
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Figure 5.2 Private Set Intersection between Alice and the RRS 
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Figure 5.2 illustrates such a PSI session between Alice and the RRS. Before the 
PSI session launches, the CSP sends the RRS k encrypted health records associated with 
the cipher-text of their storage indices in the CSP. The encrypted storage indices are 
denoted by Enc(k), and that associates with Bob’s health record is denoted by Enc(j), 
which is generated by the CSP when Bob’s health record is submitted. If Alice is 
authorized by Bob to access its health record, Alice has received Enc(j) from Bob. 
In one PSI session, the RRS holds k encrypted health records, but only one of 
them belongs to Bob, which is Alice’s query target. If Alice has been authorized by Bob, 
the RRS can find a match in the end of the PSI process. Due to the randomly disordering 
step of Alice, RRS does not know which entry in the original set is matched. As such, 
the RRS cannot assess Bob’s health status according to the medical specialty of Alice. If 
no match had found by the RRS, the RRS rejects to send any health records to Alice. 
In one PSI session, the possibility of the RRS to correctly guess out which entry 
Alice is looking for is 1/k. Larger k means better protection for Bob’s health status, and 
therefore larger k is preferred. To complete one PSI session, Figure 5.2 shows that there 
are 2×k point multiplications on each side. On the RRS side, the point multiplication 
computations are in the format of [Ik] P, where the point P is the same in the k instances. 
However, on Alice side, the format is [I] Pk, where points Pk are different and the scalar I 
is the same in the k instances. As we will present in subchapter 5.3, comparing with than 
[Ik] P, [I] Pk requires much more computation cost for generating the pre-calculated 
tables for Pk during the computing process of point multiplication. 
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5.2 Computing Model of Multi-precision Arithmetic 
The fundamental arithmetic functions of point multiplication and bilinear pairing 
are multi-precision arithmetic such as add/sub/mul/div/exp, whose operands have n×32 
bit length and n ≥ 2. Our first task for exploring the design and the performance 
evaluation of point multiplication and bilinear pairing on the contemporary GPU 
architecture is designing the low level parallel computing model for the multi-precision 
arithmetic and the storage format of arithmetic operands, and selecting a suitable number 
system for GPU. 
Before presenting the formal design of the parallel computing model of ECC 
algorithms, we first evaluate the throughput of INT32/SPF instructions on GTX-680. 
The initial result is in Table 5.1, which shows that single addition and multiplication in 
SPF is roughly 3-folds faster than its INT version. 
Table 5.1 Execution Time of INT32 and SPF arithmetic on GTX-680 
Instruction INT32 
A+B 
SPF A+B INT32 
A×B 
SPF A×B INT32 
A×B+C 
SPF 
A×B+C 
Exec 
times (ms) 
0.0308 0.012 0.0326 0.011 0.0114 0.0117 
As we know, earlier generation GPUs have only implemented fused 
multiplication plus addition (FMA) as one instruction for SPF. However, Table 5.1 
indicates that such a FMA for INT32, or a similar mechanism, has been supported by 
GK104 architecture. This may be the reason why SPF and INT32 have similar 
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throughputs of MUL+ADD. As such, using SPF may be a good choice, and using INT32 
is also acceptable. Eventually, INT32 is adopted because of the reasons as follows. 
Given the parameters of elliptic curve and security strength select in this 
dissertation, each operand of the low-level multi-precision arithmetic is an 8×32 bit = 
256 bit integer (n = 8). Two previous studies [12][70] used SPF/DPF to represent the 
integer operands of low-level multi-precision arithmetic. In [12], the bit length of their 
operands is 224-bit, and they saved one 224-bit integer into an array of 24 floating 
points, each floating point saved 10 bits of the original integer. Such a representation 
triples (and more) the memory consumption, which is one of the reasons result in a 
relative small degree of parallelism of their computing model. Instead, we adopted the 
SPF type but represented a 256-bit integer by a float32[8] array. And then the round up 
problem is met during iteratively MUL+ADD of floating point values. Converting 
intermediate floating point results to integer after several MUL+ADD might avoid 
rounding up effect, but there is no good way to ensure an optimal insertion method. [70] 
represented a 256-bit integer as in the polynomial format with 12 double-precision 
floating point coefficients. Knowing that the throughput of Double-Precision-Floating 
(DPF) is 1/24 of that of SPF on GTX-680, such a DPF-based data representing is not 
advisable on Kepler Architecture. 
The next problem is selecting a suitable number system for GPU. Previous 
studies on parallelization of ECC algorithms were mainly based on either conventional 
Montgomery [68] or Residue Number System (RNS) Montgomery system. In the 
conventional Montgomery system, the modular multiplication c = a × b mod q is 
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implemented by one multiplication step T = a × b following by one reduction step 
reduct(T). The reduct(T) avoids to call the expensive division operation. On the other 
hand, based on the Chinese Reminder Theorem (CRT), RNS decomposes a modulus M 
to n co-prime integers m1, m2, …, mn, then an arbitrary integer X < M can be uniquely 
represented as xi = X mod mi, 1 < i < n, M =    
 
   . Computation in mod mi is 
independent with each other, so that RNS is well suited for the SIMT architecture. 
However, the RNS system cannot be directly used in a prime field since the modulus M 
is not a prime, unless two extra Base Extension (BE) steps [8] are inserted in the 
reduction step. As such, a multi-precision modular multiplication a[n] × b[n] mod q in 
RNS needs 2n
2
+5n 32-bit MUL by using four threads, while 2n
2
+n MUL in the 
conventional Montgomery by using one thread. The other two extra costs are from the 
synchronization for the complicated comparison under RNS in each reduction and 
modular subtraction, and the potential branch divergence in each modular subtraction. 
Such synchronization cost grows as more threads are set to compute one instance.  
Although the computing cost of one modular multiplication in the parallelized 
RNS is greater than that in the (serial) conventional Montgomery, as concluded in [19], 
the parallelized RNS is more efficient when it is applied to a long addition sequence of 
modular multiplication (a × b+ c × d+ e × f +…) mod q. Such sequences frequently 
appear in the bilinear pairing algorithm, and lengths of such sequences are closely 
dependent to which extension fields the lazy reduction technique [3] is applied to. 
Therefore, comparison of RNS and conventional Montgomery will be discussed together 
with the evaluation of general lazy reduction in subchapter 5.4. In this subchapter, we 
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quantitatively evaluate the performance of multi-precision arithmetic in the conventional 
Montgomery system. 
In terms of the suitability of parallelizing multi-precision arithmetic in the 
conventional Montgomery system, we note that the multi-precision multiplication T=a×b 
is consisted of multiple independent sequences of MUL+ADD operations, mapping them 
to multiple threads is similar to mapping computing of multiple sub-residues in RNS to 
multiple threads. Second, the reduction step reduct(T) includes two multiplications and 
one addition, most of which can be easily parallelized. 
In this research, because a × b mod q in the base field Fq is not only the most 
expensive operation in Fq, but also the most frequently invoked low-level arithmetic 
operation in point multiplication and bilinear pairing, it is selected as the representative 
code segment to evaluate several parallel computing model options. As aforementioned, 
in the conventional Montgomery system, c = a × b mod q is composed of (1) T = a × b 
and (2) c = reduction(T). In both point multiplication and bilinear pairing algorithms, the 
modulus q, elements a, b, c needs one uint32[8] array, and the intermediate result T one 
uint32[16] array. Four parallel computing models are worth evaluating, they can be 
formally named as CI-1/2/4/8thread models, where each computing instance (CI) is 
performed by 1/2/4/8 co-operative thread(s). Another common computing model, known 
as the bit-slice model proposed in [54], is ignored in our work because the reduction in 
this model shows highly sequential nature. 
In the computation of (1) T = a × b and (2) c = reduction(T), the access pattern of 
a and b in the shared memory space can affect the access speed and thus affect the 
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overall performance. In the shared memory, operands a and b are defined as 
“__shared__ uint32[8× BLK_CI_SIZE]”, where BLK_CI_SIZE is the number of 
CIs per block. Taking the CI-2thread model as an example, each two threads access the 
same uint32[8i+0,8i+7], 0 < i < BLK_CI_SIZE. As such, threads {0,16}, {2,18}, ..., 
{12,28}, {14,30} will concurrently read the eight uint32[0], which is a typical access 
pattern in the multiplication addition/subtraction/multiplication. However, knowing that 
GK-104 has 32 64-bit shared memory banks, the real concurrency of such an access 
pattern is only 1/2 of the expectation because threads 0 and 16 are access different ties (a 
low-level GPU memory architecture) of bank 0 and thus they compete the memory 
interface. Because each SMX in GK-104 has 32 LD/ST units, analyzing this type of 
bank conflict is limited within a warp of threads. 
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Figure 5.3 Collision-free Memory Access of a 256-bit Variable (CI-2thread) 
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Taking the CI-2thread model as an example, to remove such bank conflicts, a 
strip of 64-bit chaff spacer in the front of every eighth-uint32[8]. Figure 5.3 illustrates 
such an insertion scheme for saving a[8×BLK_CI_SIZE] in the shared memory. 
Furthermore, the insertion of the chaff spacer in the 3
rd
 row of Figure 5.3 is not 
necessary, but it is placed there to simplify locating the start addresses of each a. After 
applying this insertion scheme, threads 0 and 16 read bank 0 and 1 respectively when 
they are reading the first element of uint32[8] associated with their CIs. As such, this 
type of bank conflict is removed. We further insert spacer to ensure the address of each 
variable in the shared memory always starts from bank 0. 
Next, the workload balance of T = a × b is analyzed. The workload of T[16]=a[8] 
× b[8] can be considered as eight sequences of T[x]=a[i] × b[j=0~7], 0≤i≤7, and x=i + j 
respectively. Considering the overflow effect of a[i] × b[j], each sequence would rather 
be T[x] += (low 32-bit) a[i] × b[j=0,1,...,7], and T[x+1] = (high 32-bit) a[i] × 
b[j=0,1,...,7]. Therefore, the inter-dependency among sequences are the R/W order of 
T[x] and T[x+1]. If each T[0-15] vector in the shared memory is partitioned into multiple 
segments with a constant size, each segment is mapped to one thread, and R/W address 
of each thread has a constant offset which is large enough, our observation is that there 
would be no race condition on R/W T[x] and T[x+1]. Considering the bank width on 
GK104 is 64-bit, meaning T[x] and T[x+1] are in the same bank (if x is even), the size of 
the segment should be at least one bank width. It also implies the infeasibility of the CI-
8thread model where two neighboring threads in one CI would simultaneously read and 
write the same bank respectively and thus causes the inter-CI bank conflict. This 
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observation indicates that the multi-precision multiplication T[2n]=a[n] × b[n] under the 
conventional Montgomery system shows a similar parallel workload balance result to 
that under RNS. As a result, the parallelized T[16]=a[8] × b[8] in the CI-2/4thread 
models are designed as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Parallel Multi-precision Multiplication T = a×b  
We prove that there is no bank conflict within each CI and across multiple CIs as 
follows. For the CI-2thread model, Taking the first CI thread {0,1} as an example, as 
shown in Figure 5.4.a, thread 0 computes ai ×{b0, b1, b2, b3}, and thread 1 computes ai 
×{b4, b5, b6, b7}. Here, operands bj read by thread 0 are on bank 0 or 1, and that read by 
thread 1 are on bank 1 or 2. When thread 0 updates {Tx, Tx+1}, thread 1 is updating {Tx+4, 
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Tx+5}, which are two banks away from {Tx, Tx+1}. For the CI-4thread model, as shown in 
Figure 5.4.b, thread 0 computes ai × {b0, b1}, thread 1 ai × {b2, b3}, thread 2 ai × {b4, 
b5}, and thread 3 ai × {b6, b7}. Here, operands bj read by thread 0/1/2/3 are on bank 
0/1/2/3 respectively. When thread 0 updates {Tx, Tx+1}, thread 1/2/3 is updating {Tx+2/ x+4/ 
x+6, Tx+3/ x+5/ x+7} respectively. The writing address of each thread is one bank away from 
each other. It is evident that threads in the same CI, or across different CIs do not meet 
any bank conflict during computing a[i] × b[j=0~7] in current execution order. 
However, a new type of bank conflict across-CIs on GK104 is clearly shown in 
Figure 5.4. Such bank conflicts occur when threads sum the multiplication results and 
write back to T. Comparing with earlier GPU architectures, the bank width of GK104 
grows from 32-bit to 64-bit, that is, T[0-15] in one tier are stored denser than in earlier 
GPUs. As such, two segments of T with different start offsets and associated with 
different CIs may be placed on the same bank. One example is shown in Figure 5.4, in 
the CI-2thread model, threads {0,1}, {8,9}, {16,17}, {24,25} for four CIs are writing 
result T0 = a0 × b0 and T4 = a0 × b4 back to shared memory, the banks of T0 and T4 for the 
four CIs are {0,2}, {1,3}, {2,4} and {3,5}. Noting that these eight threads are in the 
same warp, and thread 1 and thread 16 are competing for bank 2. To eliminate this type 
of bank conflict, 12 registers are used to temporarily save the multiplication results of 
T0-T11 or T4-T15 for each thread, and then a serial step accumulates results of two threads. 
In the end, the NVIDIA profiling tool nvprof is utilized to validate the bank conflict 
elimination schemes discussed in this subchapter, and the profiling result of the number 
of bank conflict of T=a×b in the CI-2thread model is shown in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5 Profiling Result of Bank Conflict for T = a×b (CI-2thread) 
Theoretically, a[n] × b[n] (n=8) in the CI-2thread model cost n
2
/2 MUL, which 
is the same as computing it in RNS when using 2 threads per instance. Taking into count 
of the synchronization overhead for bank conflict elimination, the actual cost of a[n] × 
b[n] is slightly above n
2
/2 MUL. On the other hand, elimination of the type of bank 
conflict presented in the previous paragraph is also necessary under RNS if T[2n] is 
consecutively placed in shared memory, and thus switching to RNS would not bring 
obvious extra gain for multi-precision multiplication. (An alternative, which saves T[2n] 
as n separate variables in shared memory, would avoid this bank conflict. But this option 
will grossly complicate the code structure of low level multi-precision arithmetic 
functions, especially the division function). 
According to [68], the multi-precision version of (2) c = reduction(T=a×b) is 
serially optimized as an iterative loop, where the dependency across iterations impedes 
the parallelization [54][98]. For parallelization, the CI-2thread model and the CI-4thread 
model adopt the single-precision version of reduction, which includes two parallelized 
multiplication (1) m = (T mod R) q' mod R, and (2) m × q, and one parallel addition 
T+mq, where R × R
-1
 – q × q' = 1 and R = 2256. Since (1) m = (T mod R) q' mod R 
computes the low-256 bit half of T, this step costs only 56% of MUL+ADD of a full 
multi-precision multiplication. The parallelization solution for this step is similar to that 
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for a full multi-precision multiplication, which is shown in Figure 5.6. It is shown that 
the workload can be equally balanced in the CI-2thread model, but in the CI-4thread 
model, explicit synchronization is necessary since the workloads per thread are different. 
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Figure 5.6 Implementation of Reduction(T) 
To evaluate which computing model option results in the optimal throughput, we 
compare the combination of serial/parallel multiplication (1) T = a × b plus (2) serial or 
parallel version of reduction(T) (S-/P-reduct) in the CI-1/2/4thread model on GTX-680. 
The degree of parallelism of GPU in the CI-1/2/4thread models are 160/352/738 GPU 
threads per block, equivalent to 160/176/184 CIs per block. Furthermore, when 
computing T + m × q, the parallel version of reduction(T) (denoted by P-reduct) reads T 
from global memory. These configuration parameters are optimized settings, borrowed 
from the shared memory usage analysis of bilinear pairing, as will be discussed later. 
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11938 times of multi-precision multiplication and 8312 times of reduction are repeated, 
which are an estimation of these two functions in one complete R-ate pairing. Here, the 
number of multi-precision multiplication and reduction is not 1:1 matched because the 
lazy reduction scheme has been applied. 
Table 5.2 Performance of 11938 mul + 8321 reduct in Various Models 
models T=a×b S-reduct P-reduct best 
mul+reduct 
thread 
per SMX 
throughput 
(/sec) 
CI-1thread 57.87ms 39.95ms N/A 97.82ms 160 13085.3 
CI-2thread 39.40ms 36.71ms 48.73ms 76.11ms 352 18499.5 
CI-4thread 28.58ms 51.64ms 83.59ms 80.22ms 738 18349.5 
The execution time of multiplication and reduction(T) in the CI-1/2/4thread 
models are listed in Table 5.2. The last column of Table 5.2 presents the throughput (per 
second). According to Table 5.2, several important conclusions can be drawn:  
(1) The parallelization of multi-precision multiplication T = a × b works. 
However, the gain from parallelization shrinks as the thread count per CI 
increases. A possible reason of this shrinking effect is, as the thread count per CI 
grows, more synchronization is needed for summing T[i] in registers; 
(2) If the shared memory usage per CI is bisected into two threads, the increase 
of thread number per SMX is usually greater than doubling. Due to the limit of 
placing complete warps into SMX, a large shared memory usage per THREAD 
usually results in an insufficient shared memory utilization rate. As each thread 
consumes less shared memory resource, it is possible to put more complete warps 
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into SMX to approach the shared memory limit. As a result, we observe a 
maximum degree of parallelism per SMX in the CI-4thread model in Table 5.2. 
The positive effect of greater thread count per instance on the shared memory 
utilization rate is one of the reasons that result in a higher throughput in the CI-
2thread model than in the CI-1thread model;  
(3) The serial version of reduction (S-reduct) in the CI-2thread model is slightly 
faster than that in the CI-1thread model, possibly due to an outlier of the micro-
architecture; 
(4) In the CI-2thread model, the parallel version of reduction is much slower 
than its serial counterpart. The breakdown of execution time shows that 
computing m = (T mod R) q' mod R and m × q took 43% execution time of 
reduction, the rest time is spent in the addition T + m q because the T in this 
addition is a copy in the global memory. Because performing the addition 
instructions in a multi-precision addition is very cheap, 48.73ms × 43% = 21ms 
would be the true execution time of 8312 parallel reduction if all variables are in 
shared memory. Furthermore, a quantitative understanding of cost to run multi-
precision addition with one of its operands in the global memory is obtained: its 
overhead is close to 0.76 serial version of reduction in the CI-2thread model 
(calculated from (48.73ms × 0.57) / 36.71ms); most of it contributed by the 
global memory access. Such a quantitative understanding will be critical for us to 
design the general lazy reduction scheme on GPU. In brief, it can be concluded 
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that one multi-precision ADD/SUB operation in the global memory space is 
roughly costs 76% execution time of one reduction in the shared memory. 
(5) Overall, Table 5.2 shows that the CI-2thread model with a serial version of 
reduction illustrates the best performance among three options. And the CI-
2thread model is used as the low-level parallel computing model in both point 
multiplication and bilinear pairing implementations. 
5.3 Sliding Window–based Point Multiplication 
The sliding window-based algorithms [56] are the most widely used 
implementation methods for point multiplication. Among these sliding window-based 
algorithms, the algorithm with dynamic window sizes and both positive and negative 
window values is commonly recognized as the most efficient serial implementation [56], 
because it needs a minimum number of point addition for one point multiplication. This 
implementation can be described as follows: The scalar k in a point multiplication 
instance [k] P is viewed as a stream of binary bits, given a point table which includes 
pre-calculated [-L] P, [-L+2] P, …, [L-2] P, [L] P (here L is a positive odd integer), a 
window slides k from its most significant bit (MSB) to its least significant bit (LSB), 
then a formula (2
α
 + a) × 2
β
 = λ is calculated, where λ = the binary value of the segment 
of k in the current window, a is a value satisfy -L ≤ a ≤ L, if a ≠ 0, one point 
addition/subtraction is triggered if a > 0 / a < 0, and α and β are the numbers of point 
doubling before and after this point addition. Such a window sliding process continues 
until the window goes through all bits of k. The arithmetic operations used in this 
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algorithm include elliptic curve point addition, point subtraction and point doubling 
operations, which rely on arithmetic operations in the base field Fq. 
Although the sliding window-based algorithm with dynamic window sizes is 
efficient on CPU, it is not GPU-friendly algorithm. For example, assuming k1 and k2 are 
two scalars in two parallel point multiplication instances, and k2 has a higher hamming 
weight than k1. When these two point multiplication instances simultaneously execute in 
the SIMT architecture, a possible snapshot could be: for the instance that runs [k1] P, it is 
executing α times of point doubling, at the same time, for the other instance that runs [k2] 
P, a much higher hamming weight of scalar indicates more frequent invocation of the 
point addition, and therefore this instance may have done the point doubling part and 
want to run a point addition operation. In SIMT, the latter instance has to wait for the 
former. 
Comparing with sliding window-based algorithms with dynamic window sizes, 
the variant with a fixed window size is a more SIMT-friendly option for point 
multiplication. In this variant of point multiplication, no matter the values of k1 and k2, 
the instances using k1 and k2 will computes the same number of point doubling followed 
by a point addition/subtraction. Knowing that the bit length of scalars is selected as 256-
bit to achieve the 128-bit security level, if the window size equals N, then the number of 
point addition is 256/N (or 256/N + 1 if 256 cannot be divided by N). When adopting the 
variant with a fixed window size, a larger size of the window is preferred since it results 
in fewer point addition operations.  
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Assuming that the window size is set as N, the pre-calculated table for point P 
has 2
N
-2 entries {[2] P, …, [2N-1] P}, and its memory size is (2N-2) × 64Bytes. Because 
the pre-calculated table is read only during the point multiplication, it is preferred to 
utilize the 48KB (per SMX) read-only data cache provided by GK104 GPUs to store it. 
However, when N becomes too large, the pre-calculated table cannot be fully stored in 
the read-only data cache, some of its entries need to be stored in the global memory 
space. 
To utilize a large N with few access of global memory, we adopt a large N and 
store the most frequently visited entries of the pre-calculated table in the read-only data 
cache, and store the rest entries in the global memory. N = 9, 10, 11 are evaluated in this 
work. In these three cases, the sizes of pre-calculated table will be slightly greater than 
48KB (the size of data cache). When N = 9 / 10 / 11, storing the whole table needs 32 / 
64 / 128 KB, and 29 / 26 / 24 point addition is needed to run one point multiplication 
operation. N = 9 is not a good choice since the data cache is not fully utilized. When N = 
11, the size of table becomes too large, so that the majority of the pre-calculated table 
needs to be stored in the global memory space. Furthermore, comparing with the case 
N=10, using N=11 can only reduce two 2 point addition operations. As such, N=10 is 
adopted, and nearly 75% entries of the table is saved in the read-only data cache, which 
have almost fully occupied the 48KB read-only data cache. 
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Figure 5.7 GPU-based Point Multiplication (the Same P among Instances) 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the execution effect of sliding window-based point 
multiplication on GPU. Because all instances use the same public point P, the generation 
of table {[2] P, [3] P, … [2N-1] P} can be constructed before the point multiplication 
starts. 26 windows slide are needed to go through the 256-bit scalars. In each window 
(except the last window), 10 point doubling operations are invoked, followed by a point 
addition if the value in the current window interval of the scalar ki’s bit sequence is non-
zero. In sum, the overall cost for online computation part of point multiplication can be 
predicted. That is, 256 point doubling operations, 26 point addition operations, 26 data 
cache / global memory read of elliptic curve points, 26 synchronization instructions. 
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Pre-calculate [2] P, [4] P, [8] P,..., [512] P and [3] P, mark them as calculated
For each entry i marked in V, i = 1022, 1021,...5:
    recursive_func(i);
recursive_func(int i):
    find the largest calculated j in C, that j < i and  compute x = i – j ;
    if (x is not mark as calculated yet)
    {
        recursive_func(x):
        mark x as calculated
    }
    [i] P = [j] P + [x] P;
    mark i as calculated
[2] P [3] P [4] P ... [1022] P[1021] P online part visiting flags V
0 0 1 1 0
[2] P [3] P [4] P ... [1022] P[1021] P
offline pre-
calculation flags C
1 1 1 1 0
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Figure 5.8 Online Generation of Pre-calculated Table (Various Points among Instances) 
Next, we discuss another utilization case of the parallelized point multiplication 
(shown in Figure 5.2), which sets the same scalar and different points as the input for 
each instance. Its (on-line) sliding-window algorithm is skipped since it is similar to the 
case with different scalars and the same point, which have been presented in last 
paragraph. For this utilization case, the generation of pre-calculated table is more 
complicated since each point multiplication instance needs to run a pre-calculated table 
generation process for its point Pi. Because at most 26 of 1022 entries of the pre-
calculated table will be visited by the sliding window algorithm, constructing a complete 
pre-calculated table {[2] Pi, [3] Pi, … [2
N
-1] Pi} for point Pi is over complicated. An 
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more efficient way is only calculating entries that will be visited by the sliding window 
algorithm. Based on this observation, a pre-calculated table generation algorithm for 
point Pi is proposed and displayed in Figure 5.8. The vector V flags all entries visited by 
the sliding window algorithm, and the vector C flags all entries need to be calculated to 
calculate V. By default, it is assumed as all [2
n
] Pi need to be calculated in C. Then, as 
shown in Figure 5.8, a recursive process is invoked to calculate V. 
At the first glance, the recursive processes of generating the pre-calculated table 
for different points Pi are not suitable for GPU architecture due to their extensive branch 
divergences. However, the code path of these recursive processes are determined by the 
scalar of the point multiplication. Because all point multiplication instances are using the 
same scalar, their recursive processes of generating the pre-calculated tables for Pi have 
the same code path, and thus fit the SIMT architecture. As such, we implement the GPU-
based parallel pre-calculated table generation process for Pi. We will present the 
experiment result of this part in the sub-chapter 5.5. 
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5.4 Optimization of Arithmetic in Extension Fields 
Comparing with point multiplication, which only needs arithmetic operation in 
the base field Fq, bilinear pairing needs arithmetic operations in higher extension fields 
such as Fq
2
, Fq
4
, Fq
6
, Fq
12
. An arithmetic operation in higher extension fields can be 
represented as a tower of arithmetic in lower extension fields [87]. Taking the field Fq
2
 
as an example, an element in Fq
2
 can be represented as a polynomial a+bx, where a and b 
are elements in Fq, and x is the root of the irreducible polynomial x
2
 + β. That is, x2 can 
be replaced by –β. By doing so, the arithmetic in Fq
2
 becomes the analogy with 
arithmetic of complex numbers, with imaginary square root of –β. For example, the 
multiplication in Fq
2
 is in the format as: (a + xb) (c + xd) = (ac - bd) + x (bc + ad). In this 
computation, 4 modular multiplications in Fq are called.  
The lazy reduction scheme can be applied to the multiplication in Fq
2
. First, the 
computation process of (a + xb) (c + xd) can be optimized as (ac - bd) + x [(a+b)(c+d) – 
ac -bd], which reduces the number of modular multiplication in Fq to three. Second, 
instead of invoking modular multiplication for ac, bd, and (a+b)(c+d), multiplication is 
invoked. The reduction step is moved after the accumulation of (ac - bd), and 
[(a+b)(c+d) – ac -bd], so that only two reduction is necessary, one for (ac - bd), the 
other for the result of [(a+b)(c+d) – ac -bd]. Furthermore, a general lazy reduction 
scheme was first proposed in [3], which can be applied to Fq
2
 or higher extension fields 
such as Fq
6
 and Fq
12
. When the general lazy reduction scheme is applied in Fq
12
, it can 
reduce the number of reduction in a modular multiplication in Fq
12
 to 12. The experiment 
result in [3] showed that the general lazy reduction scheme could significantly reduce the 
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computational complexity of modular multiplication and squaring in Fq
12
, and thus 
greatly increase the throughput of bilinear pairing on CPU. 
On the other hand, the lazy reduction scheme has a side effect. That is, delaying 
reduction operations to higher extension fields means that each variable in lower 
extension fields has to occupy the doubled memory space before the reduction occurs. 
To apply the lazy reduction scheme on GPU, the increase of memory space usually 
means a vast of number of temporary variables need to be stored in the global memory. 
One design option to reduce the global memory visit is assigning more shared memory 
to each CI. However, such a design option also decreases the degree of parallelism. An 
alternative option is keeping the shared memory usage per CI while using more global 
memory for each CI. With this design option, the degree of parallelism is kept, but more 
global memory access will occur. 
Table 5.3 Performance of 1000 Modular Multiplication in Fq
4
 
Optimization 
choices 
Execution 
time 
Threads per 
SMX 
Shared mem 
per CI 
Throughput 
(/sec) 
lazy reduct in Fq
2
 265.4ms 352 256 bytes 5313×10
3
 
lazy reduct in Fq
4
 301.8ms 352 256 bytes 4662×10
3
 
prefetch + lazy 
reduct in Fq
4
 
304.7ms 352 256 bytes 4617×10
3
 
lazy reduct in Fq
4
 233.7ms 224 320 bytes 3829×10
3
 
lazy reduct in Fq
4
 225.2ms 224 384 bytes 3982×10
3
 
We first examine the throughput of the modular multiplication in Fq
4
 with the 
general lazy reduction scheme applied in Fq
2
 and Fq
4
. Table 5.3 lists the performances of 
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1000 modular multiplication with several different design options. The difference 
between row 1 and 2 of Table 5.3 is where the lazy reduction is applied. It is found that 
the latter case returns a worse performance outcome, even though it calls fewer 
reductions. It shows that the increase of slow global memory access has dominated the 
benefit of fewer reduction operations. Such a result is opposite to the observations of 
applying lazy reduction on CPUs. We further investigated the software-based pre-
fetching scheme [59]. In this scheme, before reading a variable of the current warp from 
the global memory, variable that will be read by threads in the next warp is pre-fetched 
to L2 cache. Row 3 illustrates the performance of applying the pre-fetching scheme with 
the lazy reduction to Fq
4
, it shows that no noticeable performance gain was obtained by 
pre-fetching. Such a result is not surprising since it is commonly known that pre-fetching 
may not always accelerate the computing process, and sometimes pre-fetching can even 
trigger some hurtful memory accesses. In this experiment, because the runtime 
scheduling of warps on SMX is transparent to programmer, the pre-fetching for next 
warp policy without hardware support cannot guarantee to make a positive hit at run 
time. 
Rows 2, 4, and 5 in Table 5.3 illustrate some marginal improvement of execution 
time when more shared memory is allocated to each CI. The execution gain is only 
marginal because the memory usage of EAGL is spatially and timely optimized. And 
therefore, less benefit can be further gained as more shared memory is assigned to each 
CI. On the other hand, assigned more shared memory for each CI led to significant drop 
of throughput due to the reduced degree of parallelism. 
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Based on the results of applying lazy reduction in Fq
2
 and Fq
4
, it is the time to 
answer whether it is suitable to apply lazy reduction to field Fq
12 
on GPU. A quick 
analysis of computational complexity for applying the lazy reduction to Fq
12
 suggested a 
sharp increase of the global memory access than that in the case of applying the lazy 
reduction in Fq
4
: when applying the lazy reduction to Fq
12
, the memory size of all 
temporary variables in a modular multiplication in Fq
12 
doubles, and most computation 
steps have to either fully reside in the global memory, or frequently invokes data 
swapping between shared memory and global memory. As a result, on the contemporary 
GPU architecture, when applying the lazy reduction to Fq
12
, its overhead of global 
memory access was deemed to be too high to make this technique useful. In summary, 
despite applying lazy reduction in higher extension fields Fq
4
 or Fq
12
 has further reduced 
the computational complexities, applying lazy reduction in extension fields Fq
2
, which 
triggers much fewer global memory accesses, is best suited for contemporary GPU 
architecture. 
As discussed in subchapter 5.2, although the RNS and conventional Montgomery 
system only determine the implementation of low-level multi-precision multiplication 
and reduction, the efficiency of these number system is closely related to which 
extension field the lazy reduction policy is used. Assuming that the same lazy reduction 
policy applied, it is concluded that our conventional Montgomery-based CI-2thread 
model needs slightly less computational complexity to run a modular multiplication in 
Fq
12 
than the RNS-based computing models in [2][19]. We assert this conclusion as 
follows. First, when comparing the multi-precision multiplication under RNS with 2 
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threads and that in our CI-2thread model, as aforementioned, they have similar 
computational complexity – n2/2 MUL plus some synchronization cost. Second, in terms 
of the computational complexity of the reduction function, [19] showed that a serial 
reduction function in RNS costs 2n
2
+3n MUL, where 2n
2
 was spent in two matrix 
operations in the Base Extension (BE). It is known that the workload of a matrix 
operation can be equally balanced to two threads, and thus the cost of a reduction in their 
RNS-based model would be n
2
+3n MUL when two threads are used. On the other hand, 
the reduction in the CI-2thread model costs n
2
+n MUL. Therefore, the computational 
complexity of one reduction function in the RNS-based model is slightly higher than that 
in the CI-2thread model. The last factor is the computational complexity reduction by 
applying the lazy reduction technique. A modular multiplication in Fq
12 
can be 
considered as multiple addition sequences of modular multiplication, each sequence is in 
a format as (a × b+ c × d+ e × f +…) mod q. When the lazy reduction is applied to higher 
extension field, the average length of these sequences becomes larger, and the number of 
reduction becomes less. In other words, the lazy reduction technique determines the 
numbers of multi-precision multiplication and reduction operations, and the selection of 
a number system determines the computational cost of the multi-precision multiplication 
(a × b, c × d, or e × f) and the reduction (implied in “mod q”). As such, the RNS-based 
computing model and our CI-2thread model get the same decrease of computational cost 
from the lazy reduction technique. 
Other state-of-the-art optimization techniques for arithmetic in extension fields 
Fq
2
, Fq
4
, Fq
12
 applied in our work include: (1) type D sextic twist [89] of the Barreto-
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Naehrig (BN) curve [10] over Fq
2
 for input points; (2) a low hamming weight BN curve 
[24]; (3) denominator elimination and lazy reduction in [87] and final exponentiation 
optimization for BN curves in [24] and [88]; (4) Karatsuba multiplication for 
multiplication in Fq
12
, Chung-Hasan SQR3 [21] for squaring in Fq
12
; (5) for unitary 
elements of Fq
12
 generated during the final exponentiation, fast squaring of elements in 
Fq
4
 [92] and Granger-Scott fast squaring [35] in Fq
12
. We acknowledge that the new 
implementation-friendly curve family [78] (a subclass of BN curve) for the optimal Ate 
pairing [94] is also important, but it is not considered in this work because of the 
extensive additional efforts to rewrite its lazy reduction-related parts for the cross 
verification of EAGL. 
Next, we analyze the trade-off between the pipelining effect on GPU and the 
overhead for memory access by adjusting the shared memory (smem) usage per CI. Less 
shared memory per CI means more threads per block and thus better pipeline utilization, 
while it also means more slow memory visits. Without a clear guidance for an optimal 
configuration rule, we gradually tune the shared memory usage per CI in an ascend order 
to find the peak point for the throughput of bilinear pairing. By summarizing the 
memory usage of point and field arithmetic functions in the bilinear pairing, it is found 
that the most frequently accessed cache could be reduced up to four elements in Fq
2
 per 
CI, quantitatively 256 bytes, while the overhead for chaff spacers and shared memory 
bank alignment is negligible. Therefore, we select the 256-byte as the pivot point, tune 
the shared memory (smem) usage per CI from 192-byte to 384-byte, stepped by one 
element in Fq
2
 (64 bytes), and observe the fluctuation of throughput.  
 87 
 
Table 5.4 Throughput Fluctuation as Shared Memory Usage per CI Changes 
smem usage per CI (bytes) 192 256 320 320 (P-reduct) 384 
gpu thread per block 480 352 224 224 224 
smem utilization rate 93.6% 91.7% 79.1% 79.1% 87.5% 
throughput (pairing/sec) 2926 3350.9 2077 2564.6 2861 
Throughputs of bilinear pairing with different configuration parameters are listed 
in columns 2-6 of Table 5.4. It is noticeable that when the smem usage per CI equals 
320-byte, the parallel version of reduction (P-reduct) can move the T in the of T+mq step 
from the global memory space (in Table 5.2) from the shared memory space. The result 
of this version is shown in the 5
th
 column of Table 5.4. It is found that the peak 
throughput occurs when each CI caches four elements of field Fq
2
 in the shared memory 
space (the 3
rd
 column of Table 5.4). According to Table 5.4, when the shared memory 
usage per CI equals 320-byte, the shared memory usage utilization rate is fairly poor due 
to the limitation of assigning complete warps of threads to the SMXs. When this 
parameter grows to 384-byte, the negative effect of worse pipeline utilization begins to 
negate the benefits of more fast memory hits. In sum, the lazy reduction in Fq
2
 is 
adopted, and 256-byte as the shared memory (smem) usage per CI in EAGL. 
5.5 Experiment Results of Point Multiplication 
In this sub-chapter, we first report the experiment result of our GPU-based point 
multiplication with the same point P and different scalars in each instance. The GPU 
platform is a GTX-680 card. Parameters of the degree of parallelism are 8 SMX × 384 
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threads, equivalent to 8×192=1536 concurrent instances. 1536 256-bit random generated 
scalars are inputs of this experiment. As a result, the execution time, including pre-
processing of scalars on CPU and point multiplication on GPU, is 32.68ms, equivalent to 
47000 point multiplication per second, where the CPU-based pre-processing process for 
analyzing the visit frequency of entries of the pre-calculated table takes less than 1ms. 
Table 5.5 Comparison of Throughputs of Point Multiplication among GPU 
Implementations 
Implementations Key size Throughput (/sec) Device Device peak 
GFLOPS 
[12] 224 bit 5895 GTX 285 1062 
[2] 224 bit 9827 GTX 295 1788 
EAGL 256 bit 47000 GTX 680 3090 
Table 5.5 compares the throughputs of point multiplication between our work 
and two recent GPU-based implementations. Before comparing the throughput 
enhancement of EAGL with existing benchmarks which obtained on earlier generations 
of GPUs, throughputs are normalize by the difference of peak device GFLOPS. 
Although the difference on peak GFLOPS can roughly reflect the difference of their 
processing strength, we understand that it is not a perfect method to measure the 
processing strength since the architectural changes across generations of GPU are 
usually coupled with different memory bandwidth and frequency, and new features to 
facilitate off-chip or on-chip memory access. After normalizing the throughputs by the 
difference of peak device GFLOPS, it is shown that EAGL has roughly 2.76 times 
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higher throughput than that in [2]. Noting that the peak GFLOPS scale up between GTX-
680 and GTX-295 is 1.72 folds, which is smaller than the throughput grows between 
EAGL and [2], it indicates that the CI-2thread model in EAGL efficiently utilize the on-
chip resources of GK-104 architecture. 
Next, EAGL is compared with several recent CPU-based point multiplication 
implementations in Table 5.6. For more benchmarks of point multiplication on CPU or 
other platforms such as FPGA, PS3, we refer readers to [2]. It is found that EAGL can 
provide 2.1 times higher throughput than that in [63]. Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
EAGL and [69] have similar code paths; and EAGL and [63] are based on different 
types of elliptic curves, where EAGL is based on a standardized elliptic curve, and [63] a 
twisted curve over Fq
2
. 
Table 5.6 CPU vs. GPU-based Point Multiplication Implementations 
Implementations Key size Elliptic curve Throughput (/sec) Device 
Optimized GLS 
method [63] 
256 bit twisted Edward 
curves 
22472 2.6GHz AMD 
Opteron 
MIRACL [69] 224 bit standardized 14509 3.0GHz AMD 
Phenom II 
EAGL 256 bit standardized 47000 GTX 680 
In the end, we present the experiment result of point multiplication with different 
points and the same scalar. Because this research is the first work to discuss this type of 
parallel point multiplication, no existing experiment result are found for comparison. In 
this experiment, 1000 random generated scalars are tested, and the average number of 
point addition/doubling to generate the pre-calculated table is 39.5, much less than 1022 
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point addition/doubling needed by the MIRACL’s pre-calculated table generation 
method. On GTX-680, the execution time of the pre-calculated table generation (in 
Figure 5.8) is 8.52ms. The rest part of point multiplication with different points and the 
same scalar has a similar computational cost to point multiplication with different scalars 
and the same point. As a result, the point multiplication with different points and the 
same scalar needs roughly 25% execution time than the point multiplication with the 
same point and different scalars. 
5.6 Experiment Results of Bilinear Pairing 
In this subchapter, we present the experiment result of bilinear pairing and some 
further analysis based on the result. First, EAGL is compared with GPU-based 
implementations in the literature [54][98]. As illustrated in Table 5.7. The configuration 
parameter of the degree of parallelism is 8 SMX × 352 threads (8×176=1408 instances). 
On a GTX-680, the execution time is 420.19ms for 1408 instances, equivalent to 3350.9 
pairings/sec. In comparison, the throughput of ηT pairing under 128-bit AES security 
strength is 254 pairings/sec on one Tesla C2050 card [54]. The peak GFLOPS of GTX-
680 is roughly three times larger than M2050/C2050, after taking into account the 
difference of computational strength, the throughput of EAGL is roughly 4.4 times 
greater than that in [54]. Furthermore, this performance comparison does not even count 
in the factor that as the FE step in [54] was not parallelized. According to such a 
comparison, it could be concluded that following the traditional parallel computing 
mapping policy, the CI-2thread computing model fits the SIMT architecture better than 
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the bit-slice model, which greatly complicates the variable manipulation in multi-
precision integer arithmetic operations under SIMT architecture. 
In the end of Table 5.7, we also include the results of [98] which achieved 
23.8ms/pairing for the composite-order pairing as a reference. However, making 
quantified comparison between EAGL and that in [98] is difficult because of the 
significant difference on computational complexity between the prime-order and 
composite-order pairing. 
Table 5.7 Comparison of Execution Time Among GPU Implementations 
Implementations Algorithm Curve 
Type 
Security Exec time 
(ms) 
Device 
EAGL R-ate, prime 
order 
ordinary 128-bit 
AES 
0.298 GTX-680 
[54] ηT, prime order ordinary 128-bit 
AES 
3.94 C2050 
[98] Tate, composite 
order 
super-
singular 
80-bit AES 23.8 M2050 
Next, EAGL is compared with existing CPU-based pairing solutions [3][14][70], 
where all the performance results were based on a single CPU core by their authors. Our 
objective is two-fold: First, we would like to evaluate the performance of EAGL by 
comparing with the benchmarks on contemporary commodity CPUs. Furthermore, our 
purpose is obtaining some in-depth understanding on the bottlenecks of different system 
architectures. Lack of actual experimental results, a perfect acceleration model is 
adopted for CPU cases where the speed up is proportional to the number of available 
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processor cores. The performance figures of studied cases are summarized in Table 5.8. 
One can see that EAGL on one GTX-680 board has about half of the throughput that 
could be achieved in [3] based on the perfect acceleration model for multi-core CPUs. 
Comparing with the acceleration rate of EAGL on point multiplication, we found a much 
worse acceleration rate on bilinear pairing on the contemporary GPU architecture. 
Table 5.8 Comparison of Throughput, EAGL vs. CPU-based Solutions 
Implementations Algorithm Device Core clock Throughput 
EAGL R-ate pairing GTX-680 1006MHz 3350.9 
[70] Ate pairing Intel Q6600 2.4GHz 4×669 (est.) 
[14] Ate pairing Intel i7 860 2.8GHz 4×1202 (est.) 
[3] Ate pairing Intel i5 760 2.8GHz 4×1661 (est.) 
However, GPU-based bilinear pairing solution supported by EAGL is not 
meaningless. It is noted that the CPU host thread that runs on CPU has negligible 
performance cost. As such, the CPU host processor(s) can utilize GPU as a pairing co-
processor, while the host processor(s) can run other business logic such as database 
management, high-throughput networking or file I/O. For an application requiring small 
to moderate throughput of bilinear pairing, EAGL can be a supplement for CPU-based 
solutions. Furthermore, EAGL is a scalable solution to provide excessive throughput of 
bilinear pairing. 
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5.7 Analysis of System Bottleneck 
Computing performance is affected by computational complexity of the 
algorithm, programming techniques, and the underlying architectures. All three factors 
need to be seamlessly integrated to achieve top performance. When the acceleration rates 
of EAGL on point multiplication and bilinear pairing are cross compared, it is found that 
EAGL shows different performance relationships when it compares with CPU-based 
implementations. When comparing the best CPU-based benchmarks reported in [63] (for 
point multiplication) and [3] (for bilinear pairing), EAGL’s throughput enhancement rate 
is around 2.1 folds for point multiplication, but roughly 50% for bilinear pairing. It is 
interesting to investigate reasons of such a phenomenon. 
The first question is whether the CI-2thread computing model, which is based on 
the conventional Montgomery number system, fits contemporary GPU architecture. The 
compilation result of CUDA compiler shows that almost all shared memory are occupied 
under current parallelism configuration, and the register count per thread reaches 63, 
which is the upper-bound on GK104 GPUs. As such, the CI-2thread model has fully 
utilized the on-chip resources of GTX-680.  
Then, the next question is whether the CI-2thread model is better than the RNS-
based parallel computing model. Because no previous studies implemented RNS-based 
bilinear pairing on GPU platforms, to evaluate whether the CI-2thread model is better 
than the RNS-based parallel computing model, the comparison target has to switched to 
point multiplication since both algorithms share the same low-level computing model. It 
is reported in [2] that 9827 224-bit point multiplication/sec can be achieved on a GTX-
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295 (1788 peak GLOPS). On the other hand, EAGL on a GTX-680 offers 47000 256-bit 
point multiplication/sec on a GTX-680 (3090 peak GLOPS). EAGL’s performance on 
point multiplication is 2.76 times higher than [2] after normalizing the difference of peak 
GFLOPS, even at higher security strength. Moreover, the RNS-based computing model 
needs extra memory space to save the matrixes in the BE step in the reduction function. 
Although it is very hard to compare the computational strength utilization rate across 
different generations of GPUs, a higher growth of throughput (2.76) than that of 
GFLOPS (1.72) at least proves that the CI-2thread model is not worse than RNS on 
contemporary GPUs. 
A comparison of sizes of memory usage per CI between point multiplication and 
bilinear pairing gives us some clues on why EAGL obtains different performance 
acceleration effect on point multiplication and bilinear pairing, vs. state-of-the-art CPU-
based solutions. The change of memory usage sizes is illustrated in Figure 5.9. It is 
shown that, in both point multiplication and bilinear pairing, the sizes of fast cache (in 
the shared memory space) are stable. However, in bilinear pairing, the size of slow cache 
(in the global memory space) fluctuates, and only in the line function calculation step, its 
size of slow cache drops under that in point multiplication. Figure 5.9 clearly suggests 
that one bilinear pairing instance needs much more global memory resources than one 
point multiplication instance. 
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Figure 5.9 Shared/Global Memory (s/g mem) Size of Memory Usage per CI in EAGL’s  
Point Multiplication of and Bilinear Pairing 
To gain some in-depth understanding about the bottleneck, the computation steps 
of bilinear pairing are broken down. One pairing computation consists of 11938 multi-
precision multiplication, 8312 reduction, plus over 20k inexpensive multi-precision 
addition/subtraction operations. Although EAGL supposes most low-level multi-
precision arithmetic operations occurs only in the shared memory and registers, 
computations in higher extension fields have to swap variables between available shared 
memory and global memory. As such, some variable swapping occurs as prior steps or 
post steps for multi-precision arithmetic operations. If assuming data swapping between 
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shared memory and global memory has negligible cost, then the computation cost of a 
bilinear pairing operation is equivalent to the sum of computing 11938 multi-precision 
multiplication, 8312 reduction, plus 20k multi-precision addition/subtraction operations. 
In those arithmetic operations, the multi-precision addition/subtraction operations take 
less than less than 15ms if all operations occur in the shared memory space. According 
to the result shown in Table 5.2, running 11938 multiplication plus 8312 reduction 
operations in the shared memory space and registers takes 76ms. The overall estimated 
execution time is close to 91ms, which is much less than the actual execution time 
(420ms). 
Even though the hardware level profiling tools is not available for precise 
measurement, it is asserted that a large proportion of execution time (420ms) is spent in 
variables swapping between shared memory and global memory spaces as follows: 
further breakdown of execution time shows that each powering of arbitrary x in Fq
12
 in 
the Final Exponential (FE) step takes 47ms. On the other hand, NVIDIA’s profiling tool 
nvprof shows that one concurrent global memory copy of elements in Fq
12
 takes 35μs. 
Because a global memory access usually takes hundreds of cycles, and GTX-680 has 
1006MHz processor unit, such an execution time for one concurrent global memory 
copy of elements in Fq
12
 is reasonable. Furthermore, nvprof shows that one powering of 
x in Fq
12
 triggers nearly 500 times more global memory hits than a copy in Fq
12
. Such a 
ratio indicates that global memory hits in one powering of arbitrary x in Fq
12
 takes almost 
17ms, equivalent to 35% of the execution time. And this estimated percentage has not 
counted in extra synchronization and branch divergent cost associated with global 
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memory hits, which occurs if one global memory hit is embedded by an if-else statement. 
One example is the borrow bit calculation in the multi-precision subtraction operation. In 
sum, it can be concluded that a major proportion of execution time is spent in swapping 
variable between the shared memory space and the global memory space. 
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This dissertation explores design issues for parallelization of SFE-based secure 
Edit distance (ED) and Smith-Waterman (SW) algorithms and the ECC-based Private 
Set Intersection (PSI) and Secret Handshake (SH) protocols on the Kepler GPU 
architecture.  
A parallel computing model for SFE-based ED and SW algorithms are proposed. 
It includes a high-throughput GPU-based gate (de-)garbler, a static memory 
management strategy, pipelined design, and general GPU resource mapping policies for 
DP problems which is parallelized based on the wavefront parallel computing pattern. 
This dissertation shows that, with very little waste of processing cycles or memory 
space, the Kepler GPU architecture can be fully utilized to run billions of garbled gates 
to implement SFE-based ED and SW algorithms. 
Second, this dissertation shows that the conventional Montgomery-based number 
system is friendlier to the Kepler GPU architecture than the RNS–based Montgomery 
number system is, based on the comparison of throughputs in this work vs. those 
reported in [2]. Furthermore, on Kepler GPU architecture, the lazy reduction in the 
quadratic extension field obtains better throughput results than that in the quad or the 
twelfth extension field, which is contrary to the results reported on CPU architectures 
[3]. The Elliptic curve Arithmetic GPU Library (EAGL) is implemented, which can run 
3350.9 R-ate (bilinear) pairing/sec, or 47000 point multiplication/sec at the 128-bit 
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security level. Although this dissertation does not study other bilinear-pairing-based 
secure protocols such as key agreement [29][97], identity-based encryption [18][95], 
identity-based signatures [71][90], short signature schemes [15][47][64], EAGL can be 
applied in the construction of these protocols in a straight-forward fashion. 
Third, this dissertation illustrates that simple ECC-based computations, such as 
point multiplication or field arithmetic in the quadratic extension field can be effectively 
supported by the Kepler GPU architecture. It is identified that lacking of advanced 
memory management functions in the contemporary GPU architecture impose some 
limitations on bilinear pairing operations. Substantial performance gain can be expected 
when the on-chip memory size and/or more advanced memory prefetching mechanisms 
are supported in future generations of GPUs.  
With respect to the modular structure and the tool chain for automation of SFE-
based computing problems, three new challenges shall be solved for the future 
generation of the GPU-based parallel computing model. Firstly, unlike [65] [40] and 
[43], where wire label are generated when a gate is garbled, the computing model 
proposed in this dissertation pre-assigned wire labels before a task is dispatched to GPU 
for garbling. As a result, the parallel computing model proposed in this dissertation 
needs a fine-grained categorization of wire labels (Lo, LG and Li), while [65] [40] and [43] 
do not. A new description language needs to be invented, so that the tool chain can 
extract wire label categorization information for the SHDL execution engine. Second, 
because the parallel computing model proposed in this dissertation needs to utilize the 
maximum usage for each type of wire label, an offline parser needs to be invented to 
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assess maximum usage of wire labels, encrypted results for each GC-slot of the SFE-
based DP matrix. The offline parser should accept arbitrary sizes of the DP matrix. Third, 
Because SHDL cannot cover the inter-dependency specification among garbled circuit, 
and among GC-slots, a new specification language needs to be design as a supplement of 
SHDL. This new description language should not only be able to describe inter-
connections among GCs, but also describe wire label types of these inter-connections to 
facilitate the pre-assigning at runtime. Then, implementing a comprehensive tool chain 
becomes practical. 
With GPU being a major branch of parallel architectures to support massively 
fine-grained parallelism, how to match computing needs of privacy-preserving protocols 
with the GPU architecture is an open research challenge for now, and the future. To 
understand what revisions are needed for EAGL when expanding it to future generation 
GPUs, the specification changes between Fermi (an elder generation of Kepler) and 
Kepler are studied, and three major library factors are empirically identified as follows: 
The first factor is revising the insertion offset of the chaff spacer in the collision-
free shared memory access model for arithmetic in the base field. Due to the change of 
bank width (from 32-bit to 64-bit as Fermi evolves to Kepler), one 256-bit operand is 
placed in 4 consecutive banks, instead of 8. A chaffer with the same width of the bank 
width needs to be inserted before the first complete operand in a tier. When expanding 
EAGL to next generation GPUs, revising the insertion offset is necessary when the 
width or the number of banks is changed. The second factor is the degree of parallelism 
for a peak benchmark, especially in the implementation of bilinear pairing. Because 
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EAGL relies on a heuristic, which gradually increases the size of fast memory per 
instance, to find out the peak performance in the trade-off between memory access speed 
and the degree of parallelism, expanding to next generation GPUs needs to repeat such a 
heuristic to determine the new peak performance and associated fast memory usage per 
instance. Since EAGL is locality aware for storage of temporary variables in low level 
arithmetic functions, only the top level function which specifies fast memory usage per 
instance needs to be modified. The last most important factor is the efficiency of lazy 
reduction may change due to the new global memory accessing speed on next generation 
GPUs. It is possible that lazy reduction in Fq
4
 or Fq
12
 will be more effective. EAGL has 
implemented lazy reduction in Fq
4
 and thus only lazy reduction in Fq
12
 needs to be done 
if lazy reduction in Fq
4
 shows positive acceleration effect. 
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